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Abstract
This study took a quantitative look at the statistical effect on admissions of NCAA
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), formerly Division IA, institutions’ moves from one
athletic conference to another conference with greater athletic success. This study was unique
because although previous research in the area of college athletics had identified number of
applications and quality of the applicants as variables associated with athletic success, there has
been minimal research on the statistical relationship of changing football conferences while
using these variables. This study also provides a clear definition and ranking system for yearly
conference prestige. The research question of this study looked at whether schools’ moving to
more prestigious conferences affected applications, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores,
both immediately and three years after the movement. The study determined that the
relationships were not statistically significant across all areas. Implications of the study,
limitations, and potential future research are all discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The first collegiate football game took place in 1869, between Rutgers University and
Princeton University. That same year, the first collegiate football conference, which would later
be known as the Big Ten, was established. In the over 120 years since, 24 conferences have been
formed, and over 130 schools have competed in the highest level of collegiate football. During
this time, college athletics, particularly football, has become a major part of American culture
(Pettit, 2014). College football is not just a Saturday afternoon event; games are nationally
televised three to four days of each week. ESPN and Fox Sports launched networks devoted
entirely to college sports in 2004, with specific conferences forming their own networks in the
years following. This has enabled younger viewers to be influenced on the perception of a school
through their athletic programs (Barkey, 2018). The College Football National Championship
and college football postseason bowl games amplify the relationship college sports has with our
society, as well as the financial rewards universities reap from these games.
During the growth and expansion of college athletics, the relationship between successful
collegiate athletic programs and their impact on academics and admissions rates has become a
highly debated topic (Pope & Pope, 2009). Allen and Peters (1982) were the first to examine the
influence of athletic success on academics at one institution. They found freshman students at
DePaul University were influenced to attend the school based on the success of their men’s
basketball team. McCormick and Tinsley’s (1987) seminal research was the first study to
examine a possible connection between successful collegiate athletic programs and academics at
more than one institution. The research demonstrated the positive relationship between the
success of college athletic programs and academic success of students. The study also found
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removal of an athletic program could be detrimental to a school. Tucker and Amato (1993)
conducted similar research, within different time frames. They found successful football
programs increase the quality of students’ SAT scores. Since the studies were conducted more
than two decades ago, universities still have trepidation on understanding the relationship
between a successful athletic program and their institution’s student enrollment and the quality
of student enrollment. Recent studies have not been able to provide a complete understanding of
the impact athletic success has on an institution’s student enrollment, or the quality of student
enrollment. Anderson (2017) used data from all of the Division I-A Football Bowl Subdivision
games played from 1986 to 2009 and found that success leads to more applications and greater
academic reputation. However, Childs (2018) found that unexpected success in the Men’s
NCAA Basketball tournament did not lead to a greater number of applicants.
Background
Mainly focusing on high level football and men’s basketball, the existing literature on the
relationship between collegiate athletic programs and college admissions has mixed findings
(Mandel, 2013). Athletic success leads to excess media coverage and exposure. The additional
attention on schools is thought to have a positive impact on the school’s reputation, leading to
more applications for the institution, referred to as the “Flutie Effect” (Chung, 2013). However,
researchers have also found no increase in admissions following success, including findings of a
negative impact on applications following success (Childs, 2018).
In 1984, Doug Flutie, an undersized quarterback, was the play caller and leader for the
12th-ranked Boston College Eagles. During a game against the reigning national champion
University of Miami Hurricanes, Flutie threw a 65-yard touchdown pass on the final play of the
game. Boston College defeated the University of Miami by two points, 47-45. Two weeks later,
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Doug Flutie was awarded the highest and most prominent honor for a collegiate athlete, the
Heisman Trophy. The award is given annually to the nation’s best college football player (Oslin,
2004). Boston College and Doug Flutie were media darlings. Flutie appeared on countless talk
shows and was on the cover of numerous magazines, drawing national attention. The following
spring semester, Boston College received a 16% increase in applications, followed by a 12%
increase the following academic year. “Flutie Factor,” first coined in 1984, by The Washington
Post, has been used to describe the relationship between collegiate athletic success and increased
applications due to media exposure (Bradley, 1984).
Both anecdotal evidence and empirical research have found a relationship between
athletic success and increased applications. Many schools have experienced the Flutie Effect,
seeing substantial increases in applications in the years following success in the NCAA Men’s
Division I Basketball Tournament (Chung, 2013). Pope and Pope (2009) found that on average,
appearing in the tournament results in a 1% increase in applications, reaching the Sweet Sixteen
an increase of 3%, the Final Four a 4% to 5% increase, and an 8% increase for the National
Championship game. Gonzaga University men’s basketball team reached the Elite Eight or
Sweet Sixteen of the tournament from 1997 to 2000, after previously only playing in one
tournament game in the school’s history. From 1998 to 2001, the school saw over a 50% increase
in applications (McEvoy, 2005). Gonzaga also saw an increase in donations during this time
period. Donations reached over $15 million, aiding in the funding for a new $25 million athletic
facility (Johnson, 2000).
Several other institutions have experienced an increase in applications following success.
In the 1980s, Georgetown University and Duke University experienced a spike in freshman
applications (McDonald, 2003; Saul et al., n.d.). During the 1990s the University of
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Massachusetts had a similar experience (Zimbalist, 2001). George Mason University experienced
an increase in applications in the 2000s (Carroll, 2008). Butler University, Florida Gulf Coast
University, and Virginia Commonwealth University all experienced an increase in applications
following athletic success in the 2010s (Conn, 20144; Dosh, 2012).
Several schools have experienced the Flutie Effect not only for basketball but also in the
years following success in the NCAA Men’s Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)
(McEvoy, 2006). No collegiate institution may be more closely identified with their football
program than the University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame saw an increase of 125% in their
applications from 1977 to 2007 (Carroll, 2008). In the 1980s, the University of Miami had a 33%
increase in applications following their National Championship season (Toma & Cross, 1998). In
the 1990s, Northwestern University and the Georgia Institute of Technology had a similar
experience (Toma & Cross, 1998; Zimbalist, 2001). In the 2000s, Appalachian State University,
Boise State University, and the University of Missouri saw an increase in applications (Dosh,
2012; Cotterell, 2015).
Extending the findings of McCormick and Tinsley (1987), researchers have questioned
the validity of the Flutie Effect, the relationship between athletic success and application rates.
The increase in applications following athletic success is evident; however, some researchers
have questioned the correlation. McDonald (2003) cited that the data are often obtained for a few
institutions, following one monumental event. McDonald argued that Flutie did not have the
impact on applications the public believes. Ten years prior to Flutie’s arrival on campus, Boston
College launched an action plan to increase visibility on a national scale, including changing the
way they allocated financial aid, market research, and a new alumni networking system. It was
asserted that the rise in applications was a result from investment in improvements to the
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physical campus and buildings. McDonald pointed to the 9 and 17% increases in applications
following two of the worst seasons for Boston College’s football team in 1979 and 1998. Sperber
(2000) found smaller schools that do not have national recognition are not positively affected by
success.
Although scholars are not in complete agreement over the magnitude of the impact
collegiate athletic success has on admissions, they agree that there is an effect on the applications
of institutions achieving athletic success.
Statement of the Problem
Division I schools spend up to eleven times as much money on their student athletes as
their non-student athletes (The Knight Commission, 2010). In 2010, The Knight Commission on
Intercollegiate Athletics, a panel of members from academia, athletics, and journalism, focusing
on academic policies and values to ensure athletic programs stay true to their university’s
academic mission, recommended that higher education institutions not increase their spending on
intercollegiate athletics. From 2004 to 2014, on average, the schools in the Power Five
Conferences, the highest profile divisions in college athletics, doubled their athletic budgets.
During this time, half of the schools operated at a deficit, with one quarter of the schools losing
more money in 2014 (Hobson & Rich, 2015).
Although universities have concerns about the cost and time of moving to more
competitive conferences, schools have forfeited their traditions to join more successful
conferences. Schools have realized that they cannot magically create winning programs by
allocating resources, what they can do, is create perceived success by association. Schools have
attempted to do this by joining more successful athletic conferences. From 2010 to 2013, almost
one quarter of major Division I football programs changed conferences (“Tracing the History,”
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n.d.). In 1998, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) was created; this was a turning point in
conference realignment. The BCS was created as a system to select eight of the top-ranked
schools to play in four bowl games, designating one of the bowl games each year to determine
the National Championship game. This marked the first time Division I-A football had a
designated game to determine a National Champion. In 2006, a fifth bowl game was added, the
National Championship game, and two more teams were added. Following the 1998 creation of
the BCS, schools have changed conferences over 80 times in less than 20 years. As a result of the
movement and realignment, five conferences emerged as the dominant conferences in FBS,
known as the Power Five conferences (Daughters, 2017). Texas Christian University (TCU) is
viewed as a model other programs can follow. TCU was a member of the Southwestern
Conference (SWC) for over 70 years. When the SWC disbanded in 1996, TCU joined three nonPower 5 conferences, each viewed as more prestigious than the last, until landing in the Big 12, a
Power 5 conference, in 2012. Research has been conducted on the effects of athletic success, but
there is a lack of literature on the effects of schools changing athletic conferences.
Purpose of the Research
The majority of research pertaining to the association of athletics with admissions focuses
on athletic success. There have not been a great number of studies examining the association of
athletics with admissions with a focus on institutions changing conferences. Recently, Kramer
(2016) conducted a case study involving three FBS institutions, interviewing administrators and
faculty at each school, in order to determine why their school changed conferences. This study
was vastly different. In particular, this study looked at admissions, both in number of
applications and SAT scores of accepted students, for the years preceding and the years
following a move to a more prestigious conference. The current body of research looks at these
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factors after athletic success, but not after conference movement. Although success and
movement have happened concertedly, researchers have not specifically examined movement.
Additionally, most of the research fails to uniformly define success. While controlling for
athletic achievement, this study does not examine the impact of success; rather, it focuses on the
clear movement of an institution to a more prestigious conference. Top-tier Division I collegiate
football conferences experienced their greatest changes between 1998 and 2018. In total, 85
times (the same schools changed conferences more than once) schools changed conferences. The
Data Source and Sample section in Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of how conference
prestige was determined. The purpose of this study is to determine if changing conferences to a
new conference with greater athletic success benefits schools through an increase in applications,
admitted students, enrolled students, and SAT scores of accepted students.
Research Question
This study attempted to determine the statistical relationship, if any, between NCAA
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools changing their football conference and
application, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores. To address the relationship, the following
research question guided the data collected and methodology for analysis:
1. Does changing conferences to a new conference, with higher prestige in football, benefit
schools through an increase in applications, admitted students, enrolled students, and
SAT scores of accepted students?
The institutions changing conferences data for one and three years after they changed
conferences will be compared to all other FBS schools that did not change conferences during
the same timeframe. The research question will help determine if there is a statistical relationship
between schools leaving their FBS conference, the most highly visible college athletic division in
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all of collegiate sports, to join a more successful FBS conference and application, admissions,
enrollment, and SAT score. The research will look at the schools three full years after they
entered the new conference, compared to all other FBS schools that did not change conferences
during the same time frame. This will help determine if there is a relationship among
applications, admitted students, enrolled students, and SAT scores of accepted students.
Significance of Study
Dating back to the first collegiate athletic competition in 1852, college athletics have
influenced and played a major role on the campuses of higher education institutions in the United
States. No sport has influenced the perception and perceived prestige of schools more than
football. Football is the most visible and influential sport on campus, especially among FBS
schools (Won & Chelladurai, 2016). Success in football coincides with admissions, donations,
overall reputation, and visibility of a school. In an attempt to garner these effects, institutions
have changed their athletic football conferences at an increasingly high rate. Over the past 20
years, schools have changed conferences 85 times. With significant predicted movement in 2023
and 2035, due expiring television contracts of the Power 5 conferences—Big Ten, Pac-12, Big
12 in 2023; and SEC and ACC in 2035 (Rittenberg, 2017)—this study will benefit a multitude of
universities as they approach their future decision-making.
Chapter 2 will review the literature pertaining to the history of collegiate athletics,
criticisms of intercollegiate athletics, influences of athletic success on higher education
institutions, admissions of universities, applications affected by athletic success, and conferences
in collegiate football. Chapter 3 will discuss how the data were gathered and the methods used in
this study. It will include research question, data source and sample, treatment group,
comparison group, variables, and limitations. Chapter 4 will present and interpret the regression
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results for applications, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores, for one year and three years
after schools moved to more prestigious conferences. Chapter 5 concludes the findings and
provides implications of this study and includes suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
History of Collegiate Athletics
Influenced by the University of Oxford and University of Cambridge, the first official
collegiate athletic competition in the United States was a two-mile rowing race between Harvard
University and Yale University on August 3, 1852 (Thelin, 2004). In 1843, Yale formed the first
collegiate boat club in the United States, and one year later Harvard formed the second (Yost,
2010). During the first few years of each school’s boating club, competitive races only took
place within the same school’s team. This changed when the Boston Concord and Montreal
Railroad Company realized a sporting event between rival universities would bring guests to the
area and create revenue for their new above-ground rail line (Yost, 2010). The railroad company
first approached Yale and informed them that if they issued a challenge to Harvard, the company
would sponsor the event, paying for all of the expenses, and provide the athletes with luxurious
gifts, prizes, and alcohol. Harvard accepted and won the race handily (Betts, 1974). Over the
next ten years the race took place sporadically. In 1864, the race became an annual event and is
currently still held each year (Sulieman, 2018). This inaugural sporting event created the first
spillover of academic rivalry into the field of sports. Harvard and Yale are still academic and
athletic rivals today. The competition also foreshadowed the interest Americans would have in
college sports, as well as established the relationship between collegiate sporting events and
corporate sponsorships (Shulman & Bowen, 2002).
Although Yale and Harvard’s race was the first official collegiate athletic competition in
the United States, there is a history of sporting events taking place at the university level before
1852. The earliest records of competition are of Princeton University students taking part in a
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game, similar to current-day hockey, in 1787 (Rudolph, 1990). Due to colleges’ strict rules and
regulations, students often turned to extracurricular activities for socialization with their peers.
This began with debate clubs; students would form teams, conduct research, and argue the
current topics of the day with their peers. By the 1840s, fraternity life took the place of debate
clubs as the main form of socialization for college students (Smith, 1990). Along with
developing the intellect and social skill, fraternities also fostered the growth of physical
attributes. Although athletic competitions were popular among fraternities, informal contests
between academic classes became prevalent. To counteract the hazing and fighting amongst
academic classes, sporting events would take place. Wrestling matches and football games were
contested. The games did not resemble the current sports today; there was a great deal more
brutality among the students. The football games were often played with freshmen and juniors
against sophomores and seniors, on the first Monday of the fall semester. The games were so
barbarous that on some campuses the day was known as “Bloody Monday.” Although
uncivilized, these activities would be the foundation for the current collegiate athletic programs
(Rudolph, 1990).
A number of universities promoted physical fitness activities and exercises as early as the
1820s. Some universities felt physical activities would lessen a student’s abilities to properly
focus on their formal education. However, gymnasiums and fitness programs became popular on
college campuses in the 1840s. Students were returning from studying in Germany, where
physical fitness was a major part of a student’s daily activities. In response to students’ interest,
several American universities had new state-of-the-art gymnasiums built (Rudolph, 1990). This
led to an increase in interest in baseball, running, football, fishing, swimming, bowling, and
boxing on college campuses (Smith, 1990). In 1860, universities were establishing Departments
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of Hygiene and Physical Education to ensure the health of their students. Universities began to
believe if a student was in good physical condition, it would help them perform better
academically (Rudolph, 1990). Outside of the university setting, private athletic clubs aided in
the national growth of physical education and fitness for future college students. By the 1850s
the New York Athletic Club (NYAC) and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)
opened gyms in most major cities (Betts, 1974).
Several sports grew in popularity by the end of the 19th century. Baseball was among the
most popular sports at this time. The first college baseball game was played on July 1, 1859, in
Massachusetts. With the growth of professional baseball throughout most American cities,
universities began forming teams (Betts, 1974). Baseball was thought to be a sport for “every
man.” The equipment was inexpensive and an athletic physique was not required to be successful
(Rudolph, 1990). The inexpensiveness of track and field also attracted the interest of college
students. Although rowing, baseball, and track and field overshadowed most sports, lacrosse,
polo, and boxing also became popular in the Northeast at the end of the century (US Lacrosse,
n.d.). Due to the popularity of sports, universities began to allocate more resources to their
athletic programs. This was not only done to meet the needs of their students but also to help
promote their school. Successful sports programs were beginning to have an association with the
perception of universities. No sport would have as big of an influence on a university’s
perception as football. For example, Massachusetts Agricultural College, now known as UMass
Amherst, did not see themselves as a “real college” until they defeated the University of Harvard
in an 1870 football game (Rudolph, 1990).
The first college football game took place between Rutgers University and Princeton
University on November 6, 1869, in New Brunswick, New Jersey. The game did not resemble
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the football of today; rather, it was similar to rugby or soccer. Each university had a specific set
of rules, and games were played under the rules of the school hosting the game (Shulman &
Bowen, 2002). With the popularity of the sport growing, college football games were being
played in front of 40,000 people in the late 19th century (Fleisher et al., 1992).
The increased popularity of football led to the formation of athletic conferences, and
schools formed conferences based on their geographical location. In 1876, there was a meeting
on how to make the game safer for the student athletes. During this meeting, Harvard, Yale,
Princeton, and Columbia formed the Intercollegiate Football Association (IFA). The association
lasted until 1896, and later became the Ivy League (Fleisher et al., 1992). In 1895, a group of
Midwest schools met to discuss the rules pertaining to amateur athletes. They called themselves
the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives. Some members of the group would
subsequently form the Big Ten. In 1890, Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas, and Iowa formed the
Western Intercollegiate Football Association. These schools later formed the Big 8, now known
as the Big 12 (Betts, 1974).
Collegiate football gained popularity, not only forming conference associations but also
bringing about an atmosphere of fun and excitement. In order for fans to display their support for
the school they were cheering for, schools began to have school colors, banners, and posters at
games (Rudolph, 1990). Players and coaches became stars. Local newspapers would follow
players and coaches around campus, often featuring cover stories on them. Not only did students
and alumni have a connection to their university, now people that did not have the ability to
attend college were able to feel part of the school by cheering for a particular university, with
everyone in a certain region rooting for the same team (Rudolph, 1990).
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With the rising popularity, college football garnered the attention of mainstream
America, the pressure to win from fans and alumni became evident for universities. However,
the mounting burden to win games resulted in negative consequences (Rudolph, 1990).
Universities realized having a successful football team was a way to make money for their
school. This led schools to have non-students on their football teams, and to hire professional
players. At the end of the 19th century, the corruption was so evident that rather than attempting
to stop schools from hiring professionals, the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty
Representatives agreed to only allow two professional athletes per team (Shulman & Bowen,
2002).
By 1900, schools also began to offer potential players large amounts of money to attend
their school. Wealthy alumni would pay students and their families. Players were not only
offered money by their schools and alumni, but also were given bribes by gamblers to
intentionally lose games. During this time, coaches’ salaries and positions in the university were
rising. Some coaches were given full tenure if they had a successful season (Rudolph, 1990).
Although college football gave universities financial gains and acclaim, the corruption
and brutality of the sport had a negative impact. One major area of concern was the number of
deaths in college football games (Bok, 2009). During the end of the 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century, there was a lack of adequate rules to ensure the safety of the
players. In 1904 and 1905 there were almost 40 deaths of players occurring during games
(Fleisher et al., 1992). As a result, universities attempted to have the sport eradicated. Columbia,
Stanford, Northwestern, Union, and University of California all suspended the sport for at least
one year, and some schools did not play games for an entire decade (Rudolph, 1990).
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The negative effects of college football were not just topics discussed by college
governing boards. President Roosevelt, whose son was playing for Harvard, was troubled by the
violence taking place in the game. In 1905, he called for a meeting with representatives from
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to converse on ways to lessen the savagery in college football.
They agreed something needed to be changed, and President Roosevelt informed them if they did
not arrive at a solution he would use his presidential executive order to abolish football (Fleisher
et al., 1992). Later that year, 13 colleges in the East created a historic conference for their
football teams, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS). The
IAAUS voted not to dissolve college football; however, they did agree that a new rules
committee needed to be created. By the end of 1905, the IAAUS’s second meeting was attended
by 62 colleges. The rules committee succeeded in their attempt to decrease the number of deaths
and life-threatening injuries for their players. Five years later, the IAAUS changed their name to
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) (Rudolph, 1990). The NCAA had a
standard set of rules for eligibility, college admission standards, and transfer procedures and
regulations. They also regulated off-the-field activities. More than 100 years since the formation
of the NCAA, their main responsibilities are still enforcing the rules of the game and eligibility
requirements for their school members (Crowley, 2006).
The formation of the NCAA and its standard set of rules and regulations gave universities
a greater assurance it would be beneficial to invest more money and resources in their football
programs. In 1923, Dartmouth College was the first school to construct an immense stadium for
their games. The stadium was capable of holding more spectators than the number of people
living in the town of Hanover, New Hampshire, where the college was located (Thomas & Cross,
1998). Harvard also built a new stadium which held almost 40,000 visitors. In response,
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Harvard’s biggest rival, Yale, designed the Yale Bowl, with almost 70,000 seats. In 1925,
Michigan created an 87,000-seat stadium (Rooney & Davidson, 1995).
Although new, larger stadiums enabled more fans to view games, the majority of fans
still followed their favorite teams through the newspapers (Crowley, 2006). Overall, television
had the greatest influence and profits from the relationship. In 1939, the first two collegiate
athletic games were televised. On May 17, Columbia played Princeton in a baseball game, and
on September 30, Waynesburg played Fordham in a football game (Crowley, 2006). At first, the
increasing popularity of televised games was a concern for the NCAA. They assumed televised
games would result in a vast decline in the number of spectators at their stadiums. In 1952, the
NCAA determined televised games did not have a negative impact on their attendance and
signed a $1.14 million deal with NBC to air 51 teams’ games (Crowley, 2006).
As a result of the growing popularity of college football, NBC paid the NCAA $6.6
million in 1965, $24 million in 1971, and $75 million in 1983 (Sandomir, 2001). While the
NCAA was benefiting from lucrative television contracts, not all of its members were satisfied
with the way the money was distributed. The NCAA split the money between themselves and the
schools whose games were televised. As a result of the unrest, three major changes took place
within the NCAA.
First, in 1973, the NCAA created a three-tiered divisional system, Division I, Division II,
and Division III. Division I was mainly comprised of the larger schools in the NCAA. Division I
and Division II schools were able to offer athletic scholarships to their student athletes, Division
III schools were not. In 1978, Division I football was divided into two divisions: I-A and I-AA,
eventually being renamed the Football Bowl Subdivision and the Football Championship
Subdivision (FCS) in 2006. In 1977, the College Football Association (CFA) was formed. The
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CFA was created to enable its 63 members to negotiate their own television contracts, rather than
the NCAA. In 1981, the CFA signed its own television contract and was sued by the NCAA.
Eventually, the Supreme Court ruled in the CFA’s favor, allowing them to negotiate their own
television contracts (Toma & Cross, 1998).
Although they were receiving more revenue from their CFA deal, the University of Notre
Dame did not believe they were being fairly compensated and broke away from the CFA. In
1991, Notre Dame signed a $38 million deal with NBC to broadcast all of their home football
games (Sandomir, 2001). The contract between Notre Dame and NBC has been renewed
numerous times, and currently runs until the 2025 season (Arnold, 2013). Notre Dame’s
relationship with NBC not only gained them national notoriety, it has also impacted their campus
and non-student athletes. Notre Dame has been able to provide over 3,000 students with over $30
million in scholarships and aid since 1991, and over $20 million has been allocated to academic
programs (Notre Dame renewing, 2008).
Football may bring in large revenue for conferences and individual schools, but nothing
has provided the NCAA with as much money as its television contracts for their men’s
basketball tournament. In 1979, CBS paid the NCAA $5.2 million to broadcast the tournament
for three years; in 1982, CBS paid $48 million for 11 years; in 1994, $1.43 billion for four years;
and in 1999, $6 billion for 10 years. In 2010, the NCAA signed a contract with CBS and Turner
Sports to nationally broadcast all 65 of the men’s tournament games for $10.8 billion until 2024
(Sherman, 2016). In 2016, The NCAA had revenue of $1.06 billion; 72% came from this
television contract. Schools have been compensated not only through television contracts, teams
are also provided with equipment, uniforms, and sneakers to use during the tournament. Many
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schools receive millions of dollars annually from apparel companies to wear their products
(Kirshner, 2018).
Criticisms of Intercollegiate Athletics
Literature on the effects of college athletic programs on higher education institutions has
been both positive and critical. There was a lack of empirical literature found on the criticism of
college athletics. This section addresses the criticisms of higher education institutions and their
relationship with athletics. The majority of these writings are not based on research with
empirical evidence; data-driven research includes student enrollment, graduation rates, SAT
scores, and revenue and expenses. The negative literature targets college athletics as money
hungry big businesses, exploiting college athletes (Ridpath, 2017). The critiques of college
athletics are as old as college athletics itself (Zimbalist, 2001).
In the book College Sports, Inc. (1990), Sperber described collegiate athletics as
mismanaged, poorly run corporations. He argued that athletic directors are incompetent, illtrained financial managers, who are able to allocate disproportionate amounts of monies to their
programs, forcing college presidents to underfund academic programs to cover the overages
from the athletic programs. Sperber (1990) did not place the blame solely on the athletic
directors. He referred to the NCAA as franchisers and described each athletic program as a
franchise. This arrangement allows the NCAA to keep control over marketing and the image of
college athletics as a whole, while several coaches continue to earn immense compensation
packages.
Zimbalist (2001) allied with Sperber and proposed a 10-point improvement plan designed
to combat the cheating, commercialization, and lack of academic standards associated with
college athletics. His proposal included reducing the number of athletic scholarships, forcing
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first-year students to sit out from athletic competition for one year, and shortening the length of
the seasons for all sports. The criticism of college sports also comes from within the university
community. Four years after last being the president of the University of Michigan, James
Duderstadt questioned why college athletics existed at all. Duderstadt (2003) pointed to the
average cost a non-student athlete spends on their tuition, in comparison to an athlete who is
unlikely to graduate from their institution. Duderstadt cited the less than 45% graduation rate of
college basketball players. Smith (2001) argued that the media is the major factor contributing to
the negative issues surrounding college athletics. According to Smith, the major television
broadcasting companies have a monopoly on the form and way college athletics is presented to
the public.
In response to the growth in revenue of collegiate athletic programs, university leaders
began to view their athletic departments as businesses. This has influenced universities’
selections of athletic directors, which can be seen as both a positive and negative response.
University of Alabama President Judy Bonner believed Mal Moore’s strong business background
makes him a successful Athletic Director. University of Colorado’s chancellor Philip DiStefano
had similar feelings towards their new hiring of Rick George (Wong, 2014).
The greatest criticism of college athletics is the debate over whether college athletes are
amateur athletes and whether they should be paid. The NCAA has a 39-page handbook
describing the requirements of a student athlete. Student athletes are defined as amateur students
who have not played or tried out for a professional team, have not accepted salary or prize
money for competing in athletics, have not agreed to be represented by an agent or received
benefits from an agent, and/or have not delayed their college enrollment to participate in
organized sports competition (NCAA, 2017). Some argue college athletes were never truly
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amateurs, dating back to the gifts and monetary awards received in 1852 by the Harvard rowing
team (Zimbalist, 2001). Due to the long hours of practice and travel, and the large amounts of
money generated by college athletes, Huma and Staurwosky (1998) have contended that it is
inappropriate and demeaning to refer to student-athletes as amateurs. Shaffer (2015) argued
student athletes are directly responsible for the lucrative television contracts, the apparel
licensing contracts, and the merchandise sold with the players’ likeness. Schools are often
accused of profiting from the likeness of a college athlete, which is a violation of the NCAA
bylaws (NCAA, 2017). In 2013, the NCAA was negligent of its own regulations. The NCAA’s
website sold jerseys with players’ teams’ names and numbers. ESPN reported the story and
pointed out the violation. The NCAA quickly removed the jerseys from their website and
released a statement admitting their wrongdoing (Shaffer, 2015).
Criticism and discontent have not been exclusive to scholars, university presidents, and
media outlets. College athletes have voiced their disdain for their current relationship with their
schools. Perhaps no two college athletes attempted to disrupt and change the landscape of
college athletics more than former UCLA men’s basketball player Ed O’Bannon and
Northwestern University’s football player Kain Colter (Nocera & Strauss, 2016). In 2009, Ed
O’Bannon filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA over the rights to likeness and images of
players upon their graduation or exit of their former schools. One aspect of the lawsuit accused
the NCAA of using the likeness of former players in video games produced by Electronic Arts
Sports (EA Sports) (Green, 2018). O’Bannon won the case, with the judge citing antitrust laws,
which are unlawful mergers, containing deceptive acts or practices. As a result, the NCAA and
EA Sports have not released collegiate video games since 2013. A $60 million settlement
between the NCAA, EA Sports, and players named in the lawsuit was reached in 2015. Former
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collegiate athletes were eligible to receive up to $7,026 (O’Bannon, 2018). Colter did not have
the same success as O’Bannon. Colter and his Northwestern teammates attempted to form a
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), in order for college athletes to be viewed as
university employees, allowing them to receive monetary rewards during their college years.
CAPA filed a lawsuit against Northwestern and was seeking to have the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) recognize them as a union. The NLRB rejected CAPA and dismissed
their union petition (Shaffer, 2015).
With the increased popularity, exposure, and monetary gains higher education institutions
have experienced as a result of college athletics, there has been a movement to compensate
college athletes. In 2012, the Institute of Sports Law and Ethics (ISLE) released a nine-point plan
for why college athletes should not be seen as amateurs and should be paid. The ISLE cited
similarities to a 2007 agreement between Google and Stanford University students, which was
later adopted by over 90 institutions, the majority of which are members of the NCAA; students
received payments for technology they created while attending school. The ISLE’s plan called
for the concept of amateurism to be re-assessed continuously; collegiate athletic programs to be
treated as businesses; and treating athletes as employees of the school, awarding them all of the
benefits of full-time employment (Gilleran et al., 2013). Others have argued for the idea of
student athletes being compensated. Athletes indirectly receive compensation through tuition,
room, meals, books, tutoring, medical insurance, rehabilitation services, and athletic apparel
(Russo, 2018). In 2015, in addition to scholarships covering the expenses of tuition, fees, and
room and board, the NCAA gave all Division I athletic programs the ability to award
scholarships, covering all costs associated with attending their school, including transportation,
personal expenses, and incidentals (Berkowitz, 2015).
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Influence of Athletic Success on Higher Education Institutions
Research has looked at how athletic success has affected colleges in various ways. Two
of the more commonly examined areas are academic outcomes and donations. These areas play
significant roles in higher education institutions. Colleges often mention students’ progress as an
indicator of success (Morphew & Taylor, 2009). In 2017, over $40 billion was donated to
institutions of higher education (Seltzer, 2018). This section will cover the influence of athletic
success on academic outcomes and donations.
Academic Outcomes
College athletes participating in major athletic programs are sometimes viewed as
athletes in college, rather than student athletes. However, student athletes benefit from college
athletics. There is strong, research based, empirical evidence demonstrating a positive
correlation, not causal, between graduation rates of student athletes and non-student athletes.
When student athletes have higher graduation rates, their non-athlete peers also tend to have
higher graduation rates (Thelin, 2004). Rishe (2003) conducted extensive research to determine
if athletic success and graduation rates have a positive correlation. One aspect of the study
looked at graduation rates for student athletes compared to non-student athletes at 252 Division I
schools. Overall, he found graduation rates for athletes were higher than rates for non-athletes.
The study also compared student athletes and non-student athletes within athletic divisions (I-A,
I-AA, and I-AAA), race, sport, and level of athletic success. Overall, Division I-A (currently
known as FBS, made up of the top-tier college football programs) student athletes and nonstudent athletes had no statistical difference in their graduation rates. Graduation rates of athletes
at Division I-AA (currently known as FCS, made up of second tier college football programs)
and Division I-AAA (made up of schools without football programs) were significantly higher
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than of their non-athlete peers. Across all three divisions, African-American athletes’ graduation
rates were higher than their non-athlete counterparts. Among all of the athletic groups, men’s
basketball and football players had the lowest graduation rates. They also had lower graduation
rates than the non-athletes attending their school. Students participating in non-revenue sports
had higher graduation rates than their peers. Successful athletic programs, which were
determined by Sears’s Directors’ Cup points, showed a higher graduation rate among all students
when compared to all non-successful athletic programs.
Using the propensity score matching (PSM) technique, Routon and Walker (2015)
conducted a study of over 444,000 student athletes and found there is a small negative impact on
their overall Grade Point Average (GPA), compared to their peers not participating in athletics,
with the greatest impact among football and men’s basketball. The study suggests this may occur
because of the lack of academic preparedness of these athletes. When comparing SAT scores,
ACT scores, and high school GPAs, football and men’s basketball had the lowest scores on these
assessments among all student athletes. Routon and Walker found that when compared to their
non-athlete peers with similar SAT scores, ACT scores, and collegiate GPAs, football and men’s
basketball players had a higher graduation rate than their non-athlete peers.
Childs (2018) looked at the influence unexpected success in the Men’s NCAA Division I
Basketball Tournament had on donations and admissions. The study used data both immediately
and three years after the unexpected success. Although there was an increase in applications and
the percent of students admitted three years after success, there was no statistical significance
with regard to donations and admissions.
The Art and Science Group of Baltimore (“College-Bound,” 2001) surveyed 500 students
prior to their first year of college. The students ranked potential employment, available
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internships, clubs, and community involvement as more determining factors than athletics when
selecting an institution to which to apply. More than one half of the respondents were unable to
name the school which won the NCAA men’s basketball tournament less than one month prior.
Males and females differed on the impact of athletics as a determining factor in selecting a
college; 52 percent of males and 38 percent of females considered some aspect of athletics when
deciding where to apply. Students who performed better on the SAT, from higher income
households, were less likely to place value on intercollegiate athletics. While these findings
provide some insight on motivating factors for students when applying for college, the study did
not control for whether the students had any interest in sports. Even though most students were
unable to correctly identify the most recent national champion, this does not mean the students
did not watch the NCAA tournament, where they may have been exposed to commercials for
successful athletic programs, promoting their potential employment, available internships, clubs,
and community involvement at their institution. Therefore, the athletic success on its own may
not have been a determining factor in where to apply, but the success resulted in exposure for the
school.
Basten (2002) surveyed 536 students to determine if athletics influenced their decision to
enroll at the University of Michigan. The result showed both in-state and out-of-state students
were influenced by athletic reputation, with out-of-state residents being more influenced by
athletic reputation than in-state residents. However, the study was unable to convey the true role
athletic reputation played in the enrollment decisions of these students, because the University of
Michigan has historically had an equally strong academic and athletic reputation. This study may
not have captured the true impact of athletic success on college selection.
Donations
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Stinson and Howard (2008) used a linear mixed model to find that donations regularly
increase when a school takes part in major college athletics, Division I-A football or basketball,
with an increase in donations when teams are successful, defined as appearing in a postseason
game. They found that schools realize an approximate increase of 0.50% for initial success, and
0.22% for repeated success. They also found private institutions experience a greater increase of
donations than public institutions as a result of success. Schools defined as having less academic
prestige were also found to have a greater increase of donations based on athletic success.
Humphreys and Mondello (2007) used Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) to review 320 schools over a 20-year period, from 1976 to 1996. Using a reduced form
econometric model, they found donations specifically earmarked for athletics increased by over
40% when a school played in a prestigious bowl game or the men’s Final Four. From 2002 to
2012, Koo and Dittmore (2012) examined 155 Divisions I, II, and III universities. They used a
purposive sample of 155 universities with a balanced panel dataset. They found that the majority
of increased donations earmarked for athletics, which were a result of athletic success, defined as
increased winning in football and basketball, came at the expense of donations earmarked for
academic purposes. Therefore, when donors reported contributing more as a result of athletic
success, the funds went to the athletic department rather than for academics. The athletic success
did have an association with academics, but the effect was of lessening donations for academic
purposes. Rhoads and Gerking (2000) looked at 87 higher education institutions over a 10-year
period, from 1986 to 1996. They found an overall increase in alumni donations following bowl
appearances in football bowl games and the men’s NCAA tournament.
Although studies show a connection between an increase of donations and athletic
success, Shulman and Bowen (2002) found that donors contributing the top 5% of donations tend
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to not care about athletic success or athletics. They found that these donors look to help aid in the
success of as many students as possible. They tend to care more about undergraduate studies,
intellectual freedom, and extracurricular activities. However, Shulman and Bowen only looked at
30 historically prestigious schools. Many of the schools, such as Duke University and The
Pennsylvania State University, had traditionally successful athletic programs; however, their
research also included schools from the Ivy League.
For the most part, institutions of higher education are associated with successful athletic
programs. Students, both athletes and non-athletes, experience increased graduation rates as a
result of athletic success at their schools. Although not always continuous, for the most part
schools experience an immediate increase in application rates. Donations are also associated with
athletic success, with specific departments receiving the monetary increases.
Admissions
Admissions has always played a pivotal role in higher education. Its role expanded
throughout the 20th century when federal legislation created more opportunities for
nontraditional individuals to attend college. Institutions began to rely on research to determine
the characteristics commonly found in successful students and the attributes displayed in
individuals who normally would not complete a degree. These findings forced universities to not
only focus on enrolling students, but also to aid them to pay for school; graduate; and, what the
university viewed most as most important, become donating alumni. This approach of finding
qualified applicants and fostering their growth is referred to as enrollment management
(Johnson, 2000).
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Enrollment Management
Enrollment management has played an integral role in the growth of American
universities throughout their existence (Rudolph, 1990). The beginning of the 1900s saw two
major changes to enrollment management in higher education. Due to the continued growth of
the student population, schools needed to designate someone to facilitate the changing campus.
The position of dean of admissions was created to aid in screening applicants, ensuring they were
fully prepared for their school (Swail & Wilkinson, 2007). The second change was the formation
of the office of financial aid. The bursar’s office was formally in charge of distributing funds and
scholarships; however with colleges beginning to offer aid and scholarships as ways to attract
students who were unable to pay for college, a separate office needed to be created (Coomes,
2000).
During the 20th century, increased federal aid and financial support helped schools attract
more students than they had envisioned. These changes made the dean of admissions and the
office of financial aid more important than ever before. In 1944, the United States passed what is
commonly referred to as the GI Bill. The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act helped returning war
veterans fund their education (Heller, 2002). The Truman Commission of 1947 advocated for the
doubling of college enrollment in the United States by 1960. As a result, community colleges
were established and scholarship programs for non-veterans were created. The National Defense
Act of 1958 helped fund higher education programs geared toward strengthening the math and
science departments in K-12 schools. Guaranteed student loans were a result of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (Johnson, 2000). As a result of continuous increased enrollment, the
competitiveness of potential students grew, making the office of admissions the main deciding
factor of who enrolled at their school. In an attempt to have the best class enter each year,
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admissions offices began to partner with familiar high schools that had produced successful
students in the past. Due to the additional options for payment for college, financial aid offices
needed to determine which potential students were most in need of available money (Heller,
2002).
Financial aid, new screening methods, Vietnam War avoidance, and the growth of
America’s population led to a 120% increase in enrollment from 1960 to 1970. However, the
1970s would not experience this same growth throughout the decade (Johnson, 2000). During the
1970s, high school graduation rates declined, resulting in a college enrollment decrease. As a
result, colleges began to lower their entrance requirements, and the federal government began to
allocate more aid to middle class families (Hoxby, 2009). Notwithstanding these actions,
enrollment numbers continued to decline, and underqualified students with lower SAT and ACT
scores continued to enroll (Hoxby, 2009). Due to lower than expected enrollment, tuition rose at
a greater rate than anticipated and forced students to stop attending before graduating (Coomes,
2000). Hossler (2000) found that because of the increased tuition students not only were unable
to afford school, they were working more hours in an attempt to finance their education,
resulting in increased college dropout rates. This research helped schools focus more on retaining
and supporting their students who were already enrolled (Coomes, 2000).
As the percentage of high school students graduating continued to decline in the 1980s
and 1990s, institutions started to market to nontraditional students and women, which made up
the majority of undergraduate students by the 1980s (Johnson, 2000). As community colleges,
vocational schools, for-profit schools, and online schools grew, the enrollment management
became more involved in the marketing of higher education institutions. Towards the end of the
1980s and into the 1990s students changed the way they paid for college. The federal
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government passed legislation, such as the reauthorization in 1986 of the Higher Education
Amendments (HEA), which slowed the growth of student aid programs. Pell Grants generally
kept up with inflation during this period, but not necessarily with the price of college. This
decreased the amount of grants and increased the amount of student loans (Heller, 2002). High
school graduation rates increased towards the end of the 20th century and continued to increase
at the turn of the century. As a result, the college population increased in the 1990s and 2000s.
This forced universities to establish divisions of enrollment management, to aid in long-term
strategic planning and financial formulations. They also focused on combining departments:
admissions, financial aid, student affairs, and academic affairs (Johnson, 2000). Today,
enrollment management offices identify qualified potential students, transition these students to
applicants, enroll these students, assist them in the process of graduating, and help mold them
into contributing alumni (Jovell et al., 2006).
Enrollment management has grown from its inception to become a major and necessary
part of higher education institutions. In 1940, 10% of Americans over the age of 25 had some
level of higher education; by 2015 that number had increased by over 300% for Americans over
25 holding at least a bachelor’s degree (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). The early passive approach of
the admissions office has drastically changed and has been replaced with an eager, calculated
function of enrollment management. As the costs and competitiveness of college continue to
grow, so will the function of enrollment management. It will increasingly become more
important in identifying potential students in the growing applicant pool (Swail & Wilkinson,
2007).
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Applications Affected by Athletic Success
Several schools have experienced notable increases in applications in the years following
athletic success. Scholars have argued over the importance of increased applications; studies
differ over the impact of athletics on a larger application pool (Chung, 2013). The increase of
applications is most apparent when a school performs well in men’s basketball and football.
Gonzaga University men’s basketball team reached the Elite Eight or Sweet Sixteen of the
tournament from 1997 to 2000, after previously only playing in one tournament game in the
school’s history. From 1998 to 2001, the school saw an over 50% increase in applications
(McEvoy, 2005). Georgetown University reached the NCAA Championship game three times in
four years from 1982 to 1985. During this time frame, they saw a 45% increase in college
applications (McDonald, 2003). Duke University also had a spike in applications following
athletic success. In 1978 and 1986, the men’s basketball team reached the finals of the NCAA
tournament. On both occurrences, Duke saw a nearly 20% increase in applications (Saul et al.,
n.d.). George Mason University experienced a 24% increase in applications, following an
unexpected 2006 trip to the Final Four. The Wall Street Journal estimated that George Mason
University would have had to spend $100 million to receive similar media publicity and
exposure garnered during the NCAA tournament (Johnson, 2000). The University of
Massachusetts experienced a double-digit increase in out-of-state applications in 1997, after their
men’s basketball team experienced unexpected success in back-to-back years (Zimbalist, 2001).
Butler University experienced a 41% increase in applications following their back-to-back
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National Championship game appearances in 2010 and 2011 (Dosh, 2012). In 2013, Florida Gulf
Coast University made their first NCAA tournament appearance, advancing to the Sweet
Sixteen, resulting in a 36% increase in applications (Conn, 2014). Virginia Commonwealth
University and Butler University both reached the Final Four in 2011 and each saw a 20%
increase in applications (Dosh, 2012).
Schools’ success in the NCAA Men’s Division I FBS has resulted in similar application
increases (McEvoy, 2006). The most well publicized example of this took place in the years
following the success of the 1984 Boston College football team, led by Doug Flutie. Boston
College experienced a 30% increase in applications over the next two years. The increase in
applications following athletic success is commonly referred to as the “Flutie Effect” (Oslin,
2004). The University of Notre Dame’s success from 1977 to 2007 saw an increase of 125% in
their applications over that time period (Carroll, 2008). The University of Missouri had a 20%
increase in applications following their 2007 top five national finish (Dosh, 2012). After
competing in the 1995 Rose Bowl, Northwestern University saw a 30% increase in applications
(Zimbalist, 2001). In 1987, the University of Miami had a 33% increase in applications
following their National Championship season (Toma & Cross, 1998). Georgia Institute of
Technology saw a 21% increase in applications after their 1990 National Championship season
(Toma & Cross, 1998). Following their 2010 National Championship season, Auburn University
saw a 15% increase in applications (Dosh, 2012). In 2007, Appalachian State University was the
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first Division I FCS school to defeat an FBS ranked school. They experienced a 14% increase in
2008 and 24% increase in 2009 in applications (Pope & Pope, 2009).
Traditionally, research on the increased number of applications tended to look only at
schools’ application rates directly prior to and after success. Winning a national championship
tended to provide a short-term increase (one-year spike) in applications to an institution, when
compared to similar institutions. At most, schools experienced a three-year increase in
applications when their victory was unexpected or was highlighted by a unique story garnering
national media coverage. Toma and Cross (1998) compared the number of applications three
years before and three years after NCAA national championships in both basketball and football.
They found a one-year increase, rather than a sustainable increase in applications in the year
following championships in both football and basketball, with a greater increase for football.
Although there is a relationship with applications, Toma and Cross do not believe it is
sustainable over several years, because of the one-year spike in applications following success.
Their study only used data from a ten-year time period and did not take continued success into
account.
Rather than examining team success, McEvoy (2006) looked at the association of
individual athletic success with application rates. His study looked at athletes finishing within the
top 5 voting for the Heisman Trophy award, and the application rates of their schools the
following year, compared to the previous year. McEvoy found an almost 7% increase in
applications. McEvoy attempted to examine individual success, rather than team success;
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however, during the time periods used, each Heisman Trophy winner competed on a successful
football team.
Allen and Peters (1982) used an open-ended questionnaire to determine if incoming
freshmen made their decision to attend DePaul University based on the previous success of their
men’s basketball team. The researchers determined the additional media exposure, specifically
televised games, influenced the students’ decision to attend the university. They also found
almost 80% of respondents expressed that when discussing their college choice with family and
friends, the men’s basketball team was the most frequent topic discussed pertaining to the
university. This study presented a substantial case for the influence of successful athletic
programs on college choice; however, the study used a small sample size of 88 students, and the
vast majority of them (n = 81) were from the Chicago area, near DePaul. Collecting data from
students from outside of the area or state may have provided a more accurate description of the
true influence the basketball team’s success had on the students. The research was also
conducted over 35 years ago.
Chressanthis and Grimes (1993) studied the effect of football and men’s basketball
teams’ winning, and televised games, on first-year students at Mississippi State University
(MSU) over a 21-year period. The research found a winning football team resulted in an increase
of applicants, while a winning basketball team had no effect. Televised football games overall
did not have an effect on applications, while winning televised football games did have a positive
effect. Televised men’s basketball games only had an effect when MSU lost, resulting in a
negative impact. Although the research found a positive relationship between success in football
and applications over two decades, the findings of this study are limited in that it was conducted
on a single institution from one of the major athletic conferences, the Southeastern Conference
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(SEC). SEC teams traditionally have high attendance and national media coverage. This may
have resulted in a favorable view towards institutions with highly visible football programs.
In analyzing the impact of success in men’s basketball on application rates at 51 Division
I non-football institutions, there was an increase in application rates (Petit, 1997). However,
there was a disparity of defining characteristics among these schools, making it difficult to
determine if the increase in application rates, over this short period of time, was due to success.
The sample size included schools in large, major conferences, such as the Big East, and smaller
schools in mid-major conferences, like the Atlantic 10.
Anderson (2017) used data from all of the Division I-A FBS games played from 1986 to
2009 to determine if winning and allocating more money and resources affect acceptance rates,
donations, applications, academic reputation, in- and out-of-state enrollment, and SAT scores.
Anderson found success in college football, decreased acceptance rates, increased donations,
applications, academic reputation, in-state enrollment, and SAT scores. There was no effect on
out-of-state applications. Anderson’s work provided insight on several effects of the success of
college football teams, but it did not determine if allocating more resources and money had an
impact.
Although there are findings on the relationship between athletic success and increased
applications, there is a lack of research on whether the additional applicants are out-of-state or
international applicants. Out-of-state and international students are often highly coveted by
schools due to the out-of-state tuition, cachet brought to the university’s reputation, and cultural
diversity displayed in the classroom (Ryman, 2013). Perez (2012) conducted a study of the
California State University system and found successful football and men’s basketball programs
led to more in-state applicants and did not change the out-of-state or international numbers.
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Mixon and Hsing (1994) suggested that successful athletic programs would not have an impact
on international students. They found international students were mostly interested in being in
largely populated areas, with several colleges around them.
Studies have also examined the quality of the applicants, in terms of standardized test
scores. Overall, research on the correlation between quality applicants and success is
inconclusive. Pope and Pope (2009) found an increase in standardized test scores for accepted
students, but concluded the universities were more selective as a result of a larger application
pool, not a more qualified application pool, displaying a positive effect from athletic success.
Using data over a 15-year period, 1978 to 1992, Mixon (1995) examined 217 schools and found
a relationship between long-term success in men’s basketball and higher test scores. In a case
study, Cigilano (2006) concluded that schools with successful athletic programs are often ranked
among the highest academic programs, and therefore higher achieving applicants are more
attracted to these schools regardless of their athletic success.
Tucker and Amato (1993) examined whether successful football and men’s basketball
programs increased both application pools and SAT scores. They looked strictly at schools with
high levels of success over a three-year span, schools finishing in the Top 20 national rankings.
Their research found that successful football programs led to an increase in SAT scores, but
successful men’s basketball programs did not have the same outcome. However, Mixon (1995)
conducted research examining successful men’s basketball programs over a 15-year period and
found a significant positive effect on SAT scores.
As research demonstrates that athletic success is often used as a means of increased
marketing and exposure, many institutions with successful athletic programs continue to receive
more applications. Without changing their traditional entrance standards, the institutions can be
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more selective with whom they accept, increasing the quality of their students (McCormick &
Tinsley, 1987). McCormick and Tinsley (1987) examined 150 institutions to determine if
consistent success over several years had an impact on applications and SAT scores. They found
that consistent success was strongly associated with increased application rates and high SAT
scores, and they found that schools in elite conferences saw a 3% increase in scores following
success, defined as winning percentage within their conference. They also discovered that
schools with major athletic programs had scores three percentage points higher than schools that
did not have major programs.
Bremmer and Kesselring (1993) criticized McCormick and Tinsley’s (1987) theory,
stating that increased applications does not guarantee a higher quality of applicants, and schools
may be selecting similar students, but from a larger pool of similar students. Bremmer and
Kesselring re-evaluated McCormick and Tinsley’s work by analyzing 119 schools based on the
number of football bowl games and participation in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.
While athletic success led to more applications, it had a small and significantly negative effect on
SAT scores, at a 0.10 level.
Examining all Division I schools, Smith (2008) found success in men’s basketball had a
marginal increase in SAT scores for one year. Despite the fact that schools benefit from athletic
success with increased applicants, minimal studies have shown an increase in the quality of
applicants. Chung (2013) argued that this is the result of students with low SAT scores being
more influenced by non-academic factors, such as sports, associated with potential schools.
Chung measured the long-term effect of athletic success on the quantity and quality of
applicants. His findings showed athletic success has a long-term impact on the number of
applicants. Applicants with lower SAT scores are impacted more than students with higher SAT

36

scores. Students with higher SAT scores tend to be more interested in academic reputation than
athletic reputation. Chung found public, state schools to be more influenced than private schools
by athletic success over a longer period of time.
Although research differs on the level of the impact collegiate success has on an
institution’s number, and quality, of applicants, the research does show there is a positive impact
on the number of applicants a school receives after achieving success in college athletics.
Athletic Conferences in Collegiate Football
The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) was established in
1906. In 1910, The IAAUS renamed themselves the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA.) However, ten years prior to the creation of the IAAUS, the first athletic conference was
formed, the Western Conference, which would later be known as the Big Ten Conference
(Shulman & Bowen, 2002). The conference’s initial intent was to monitor the schools’ athletic
programs and protect the academic standards (Covell & Barr, 2010). As the popularity of college
athletics grew throughout the country, greater monitoring was needed. Athletic conferences were
created as a consolidated voice to oversee and institute rules and guidelines for their members.
Conferences were made up of voluntary schools with similar academic standards, and profiles,
from the same geographical regions (Thelin, 2004). Over time, conferences’ responsibilities
expanded and grew, and now work directly with the NCAA to oversee several aspects involving
student athletes, including eligibility, recruitment, scheduling, and travel (Covell & Barr, 2010).
Collegiate Football Conferences
There are currently 11 conferences in the highest level of collegiate football, the FBS.
Although the Big Ten is widely recognized as the first football conference (Dennie, 2012), the
NCAA recognizes the Independent Conference’s origin in 1869, the first year the NCAA
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recognized a National Champion. Conferences such as Western Interstate University Football
Association, Maryland Intercollegiate Football Association, and Indiana Intercollegiate Athletic
Association all had members of their associations in the 1890s; however, they are not recognized
by the NCAA as official conferences. From 1869 to 2018, the NCAA recognized 24 conferences
as competing at the highest level of collegiate football for at least one season (“NCAA Football,”
n.d.)
In the 75 years following the formation of the Big Ten Conference, 14 new conferences
would emerge, in what is known as Division I. Many of these conferences were active for many
years. The Big Eight Conference was active from 1907 to 1995, the Western Athletic Conference
from 1962 until 2012, and the Big West Conference from 1969 until 2000. Four of the
conferences, Pac-12, Southeastern Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and MidAmerican Conference, are still active conferences today. From 1971 to 2012, eight conferences
were formed, five of which are still active today: Conference USA, Big 12 Conference,
Mountain West Conference, Sun Belt Conference, and American Athletic Conference (“NCAA
Football,” n.d.). Table 1 displays college football conference formation and history at the highest
football division from its origin in 1869 to the 2018 season.
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Table 1
Conference Formation and Deactivation
First Year in Highest Level of
College Football

Last Year in Highest Level
of College Football

Independent

1869

current

Big Ten Conference

1896

current

Big Eight Conference

1907

1995

Rocky Mountain Conference

1910

1937*

Southwest Conference

1915

1995

Pacific 12 Conference

1916

current

Southern Conference

1921

1981*

Missouri Valley Conference

1928

1985*

Border Intercollegiate Athletic
Association

1931

1961

Southeastern Conference

1933

current

Skyline Conference

1938

1961

Atlantic Coast Conference

1953

current

Ivy Group

1956

1981*

Western Athletic Conference

1962

2012*

Mid-American Conference

1962

current

Big West Conference

1969

2000*

Southland Conference

1975

1981*

Southwestern Athletic Conference

1977

1977*

Big East Conference

1991

2012*

Conference USA

1996

current

Big 12 Conference

1996

current

Mountain West Conference

1999

current

Sun Belt Conference

2001

current

American Athletic Conference

2013

current

Conference (Most Recent Title)
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* Denotes the year the conference no longer competed in FBS, or highest level of college football.

NCAA Divisions and Creation of National Championship Game
In 1973, the NCAA formed three separate divisions for football: Division I, Division II,
and Division III. Division I was the highest level of collegiate football, mostly made up of larger
schools. Division I and II schools were able to offer student athletes athletic scholarships, while
Division III was not. In 1977, the College Football Association (CFA) was formed. The CFA
was not created for athletic competition; 63 teams, from most of the major conferences and
prominent independent schools, came together to negotiate their own television contracts, rather
than having the NCAA formulate their deals. The NCAA and the CFA legal battle was
eventually decided in 1981 by a Supreme Court Ruling. They found the NCAA’s television plan
imposed a restraint on free market (Toma & Cross, 1998). In 1978, Division I would separate
into two divisions: I-A and I-AA. In 1981, there was a failed attempt by several larger
historically competitive institutions to create a fourth division.
Two changes to college football in 1992 would impact the following two decades. The
first was the formation of the Bowl Coalition. The Bowl Coalition was formed by college
football bowl games, to remove controversy following back-to-back years with two schools
claiming they were the National Champions. The Bowl Coalition had the schools from five
conferences and Notre Dame agree to forgo their traditional bowl appearances in order to
compete against the top-ranked schools from one of the other five conferences. The Bowl
Coalition received some criticism because it did not include the Big Ten and Pac-10 (now Pac12) conference champions, who were committed to send their top teams to the Rose Bowl. The
other change was the first conference championship in Division I-A (Himmelsbach, 2012). The
SEC added the University of Arkansas and the University of South Carolina. This increased the
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schools in the conference to 12, enabling the SEC to split in two subdivisions and have a
conference championship game (Suggs, 2000).
The next year to bring major changes to college football was 1995. With the success of
their conference championship game, the SEC would leave the CFA and negotiate their
television contract on its own. New television contracts also brought the end of two historic
football conferences: the Big 8, founded in 1907, and the Southwest Conference, founded in
1915 (Simplicio, 2011). This would result in the formation of the Big 12 Conference in 1996.
1995 was the first year of the Bowl Alliance. The Bowl Alliance was similar to the Bowl
Coalition, as it was an agreement between college bowl games; however, since the Big 8 and
Southwest Conference were no longer active, the Big 12 took one of their places, and another
team from one of the other conferences took the other. Criticism was still received, because the
Bowl Coalition did not include the Big Ten and Pac-10 (now Pac-12) conference champions
either (Mandel, 2012).
In 1998, the BCS was created by college bowl games. The BCS was similar to the Bowl
Coalition and Bowl Alliance; however, the Big Ten and Pac-12 (then Pac-10) champions were
able to play in any bowl game. In 2006, an additional game was added to the BCS, the BCS
National Championship Game. Starting in 2006, Division I would be known as the FBS and
Division I-AA would be known as Division I FCS (Simplicio, 2011).
The BCS would last until 2013; in 2014, the College Football Playoff (CFP) was created.
The CFP also had all of the schools in the FBS participating, with no bowl commitments
overwriting the CFP games. The CFP consists of four schools playing in two semifinal games
and a championship game. As with its predecessors, the Bowl Coalition, Bowl Alliance, and
BCS, the CFP has an agreement among participating bowl games. The NCAA does not award
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their National Championship to the winner of a specific bowl game. The NCAA awards their
National title based on polls, which have separate agreements with the bowl systems to vote for
the winner of the bowl systems’ championship game in their final poll as their National
Champion. This makes FBS the only NCAA sport without a yearly official national champion
determined by an NCAA game event (Mandel, 2012).
Conference Realignment
University officials have cited several factors for conference movement when asked, such
as enhancing the school’s academic profile, increasing visibility, overall growth, increased
applicants, and broadening their institutional brand and reach (Kramer, 2016). Kogan and
Greyser (2014) believed monetary incentives are at the forefront of the movement. After
changing conferences, schools receive increased media exposure and have the opportunity to
compete against more recognized competition. These benefits lead to greater postseason bowl
games and increased ticket sales.
Conferences experienced impactful realignment changes in college football between
1990 and 2013. The Big East Conference, founded in 1979, historically known as a basketball
conference, would begin one of the initial trends of college football conference realignment. In
1991, the conference would realign and establish itself as a top-tier Division I football
conference (Dennie, 2012). The Big East added five schools who played football: Rutgers
University, the University of Miami, Florida, Temple University, Virginia Tech, and West
Virginia (Dennie, 2012). In 1990, The Pennsylvania State University, a football powerhouse, left
the independents and became the eleventh team in the Big Ten Conference. In 1991, the
University of Arkansas and the University of South Carolina both joined the SEC, while Florida
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State University joined the ACC. In 1996, schools from the Big Eight Conference and Southwest
Conference formed a new conference, the Big 12 conference (Groza, 2010).
After the announcement of the formation of the BCS, there was a great deal of conference
realignment starting in 1999. Table 2 shows the conference movement from 1998 to 2018, in
total 85 times (the same schools moved more than once) schools changed conferences during this
timeframe. The most prominent years were: 1999, when 10 schools joined a new conference;
2001, when 11 schools changed conferences; 2005, when 16 schools changed conferences; 2012,
with eight conference changes; and 2013, when 17 schools changed conferences. As a result of
all of the movement and realignment, 10 conferences compete in the FBS, and five
conferences—the ACC, the Big Ten Conference, the Big 12 conference, the Pac-12 Conference,
and the SEC—are known as the Power 5 Conferences. These five conferences are viewed as the
elite football conferences in FBS. The history and name recognition are valued by these
conferences, which is shown by the Big Ten Conference having 14 schools, and the Big 12
Conference having ten schools (Daughters, 2017).
Reasons for Conference Movement
Kramer (2016) found institutions’ paramount reason for changing conferences was
increased revenue. Kramer conducted a case study, interviewing athletic administrators,
academic leaders, faculty members, and board of trustees members, from three different schools
changing conferences from 2011 to 2013. The schools were all Division I-AA colleges, and were
identified as State University, Private University, and Regional University. Kramer (2016) found
although universities cited other reasons for movement, such as new exciting opportunities and
partnering with universities with distinguished academic programs. Increased revenue was the
underlying factor in each of their movements. One administrator mentioned a fear of being left
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behind and eventually divorced from the Power 5 conferences. Another administrator echoed the
same fears and stated that if they do not take the opportunity to move up to a new conference,
someone else will take their spot. An educational leader expressed their rationale for increased
revenue through conference movement by addressing the needs of each university. They stated
the goals of each school are to increase academic quality, and increase academic impact, and to
do so requires revenue.
Kogan and Greyser (2014) found that although changing conferences may result in
increased revenue, the process of changing conferences does come with a cost. The timeline,
approval process, and fees to exit a conference vary from conference to conference and change
over time based on a conference’s bylaws. Normally, two to three years need to be given to a
current conference before exiting, and a majority vote of the current members of the potential
new conference is needed. Generally, members of conferences do not object to new members;
however, when a current member of their conference leaves, the conference wants to be
compensated financially. In 2011, Boise State University agreed to join the Big East conference,
who at the time held an automatic bid to a Bowl Championship Series bowl game. However,
when schools began to leave the Big East Conference, Boise State University decided not to join
The Big East. Although Boise State never officially joined the Big East, the conference still filed
a lawsuit against them for their $5 million exit fee. As a result of this, the ACC voted to increase
their exit fee to $50 million. The University of Maryland lost an attempt to circumvent the $50
million fee when they left the ACC. Rutgers University also lost their multimillion-dollar lawsuit
against their former conference when they joined the Big Ten (Kogan & Greyser, 2014).
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Table 2
Conference Movement from 1998 to 2018
Year

FBS
schools

Conferences

School

Previous Conference to
New Conference

10

Schools
changing
conferences
1

1998

112

Army

(Independent) to (C-USA)

1999

112

11

10

Air Force

(WAC) to (MWC)

BYU

(WAC) to (MWC)

Colorado State

(WAC) to (MWC)

New Mexico

(WAC) to (MWC)

San Diego State

(WAC) to (MWC)

UNLV

(WAC) to (MWC)

Utah

(WAC) to (MWC)

Wyoming

(WAC) to (MWC)

Arkansas State

(Independent) to (Big West)

UAB

(Independent) to (C-USA)

2000

114

11

1

Nevada

(Big West to WAC)

2001

116

11

11

Arkansas State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

New Mexico State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

North Texas

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Louisiana-Lafayette

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Louisiana-Monroe

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Middle Tennessee State

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Boise State

(Big West) to (WAC)

Utah State

(Big West) to (Independent)

TCU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Louisiana Tech

(Independent) to (WAC)

UCF

(Independent) to (MAC)

2002

117

11

1

45

Year

FBS
schools

Conferences

2003

117

11

2004

2005

120

119

11

11

Schools
changing
conferences
2

4

16

School

Previous Conference to
New Conference

USF

(Independent) to (C-USA)

Utah State

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Miami

(Big East) to (ACC)

Virginia Tech

(Big East) to (ACC)

Troy

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

UConn

(Independent) to (Big East)

Army

(C-USA) to (Independent)

Cincinnati

(C-USA) to (Big East)

Louisville

(C-USA) to (Big East)

USF

(C-USA) to (Big East)

TCU

(C-USA) to (Mountain
West)

Marshall

(MAC) to (C-USA)

UCF

(MAC) to (C-USA)

Tulsa

(WAC) to (C-USA)

UTEP

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Rice

(WAC) to (C-USA)

SMU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Boston College

(Big East) to (ACC)

Temple

(Big East) to (Independent)

Idaho

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

New Mexico State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

Utah State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

2006

119

11

0

2007

119

11

1

Temple

(Independent) to (MAC)

2008

120

11

1

Western Kentucky

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

2009

120

11

0
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Year

FBS
schools

Conferences

2010

120

2011

120

2012

2013

124

125

School

Previous Conference to
New Conference

11

Schools
changing
conferences
0

11

5

Colorado

(Big 12) to (Pac-12)

Nebraska

(Big 12) to (Big Ten)

Utah

(MWC) to (Pac-12)

BYU

(MWC) to (Independent)

Boise State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas A&M

(Big 12) to (SEC)

Missouri

(Big 12) to (SEC)

West Virginia

(Big East) to (Big 12)

TCU

(MWC) to (Big 12)

Temple

(MAC) to (Big East)

Fresno State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Hawaii

(WAC) to (MWC)

Nevada

(WAC) to (MWC)

Syracuse

(Big East) to (ACC)

Pitt

(Big East) to (ACC)

UCF

(C-USA) to (American)

Houston

(C-USA) to (American)

Memphis

(C-USA) to (American)

SMU

(C-USA) to (American)

Middle Tennessee

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

FAU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

FIU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

North Texas

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

Texas-San Antonio

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Louisiana Tech

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Utah State

(WAC) to (MWC)

11

10

8

17
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Year

FBS
schools

Conferences

Schools
changing
conferences

2013
(continued)

2014

128

10

School

Previous Conference to
New Conference

San Jose State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas State

(WAC) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

(WAC) to (Independent)

New Mexico State

(WAC) to (Independent)

Maryland

(ACC to Big Ten)

Rutgers

(American to Big Ten)

Louisville

(American to ACC)

East Carolina

(American to C-USA)

Tulsa

(American to C-USA)

Tulane

(American to C-USA)

Western Kentucky

(Sun Belt to American)

7

2015

128

10

1

Navy

(Independent to American)

2016

128

10

1

UMass

(MAC to Independent)

2017

130

10

0

2018

130

10

1

UAB

(Independent to C-USA)

Conclusion
Researchers have paid attention to the direct results of athletic success on college
outcomes, commonly known as “The Flutie Effect.” Studies have shown schools have a
statistical relationship with successful athletic programs, in areas including acceptance rates,
application rates, the quality and location of applications, and donations. As collegiate athletics
grows in popularity, prospective students and families often identify with universities through
their sports teams. With increased media exposure, several institutions have generated a
significant amount of revenue from their athletic teams. As universities have grown and altered
their mission, enrollment management departments have been developed.
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While scholars and institutions are in agreement about an effect on admissions as a result
of athletic success, universities have come to realize athletic success cannot merely be generated
by allocating resources. Spending more on coaches and athletics facilities does not guarantee
victories on the field. Universities have, however, attempted to create the implication of success
and prestige by aligning themselves with traditionally successful athletic programs (Rittenberg,
2017). In the past 20 years, there have been over 80 conference changes among FBS schools.
Schools have forgone years of tradition to align themselves with more distinguished football
conferences.
Over the past 35 years, Allen and Peters’ study spawned a great deal of research in the
area of successful athletic programs’ influence on admissions, donations, and perception. Despite
the immense amount of research, one area has been overlooked: conference realignment. This
study will attempt to determine if there is a positive connection between FBS schools moving to
a more prestigious conferences and their applicants. The research will compare schools changing
conferences one and three years after they changed conferences to schools that did not change
conferences during the same time frame. The methodology for this study is outlined in Chapter
3.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS
The purpose of this study was to examine the statistical relationship between application,
admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores of NCAA Division I FBS, formerly Division I-A,
institutions’ move from one athletic conference to another conference with greater athletic
success. This study was quantitative, using data primarily from the IPEDS and the NCAA
website and associated athletics resources.
Previous research in the area of college athletics has identified the number of applications
and quality of the applicants, as variables affected by athletic success (Chung, 2013). However,
there has been minimal research on the statistical relationship of changing football conferences
while using these variables. Institutions have changed conferences with the hope of having
greater athletic success, academic success, and financial success, in a larger, more well-known
conference; however, there has been a lack of research to determine if this is the case (Kogan &
Greyser, 2014). From 1998 to 2018, schools have changed their football conference 88 times.
This study looked at schools that moved to a conference with greater athletic success from 1998
to 2014.
Research Question
This study attempted to determine the statistical relationship, if any, between NCAA
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools changing their football conference and
application, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores. To address the relationship, the following
research question guides the data collected and methodology for analysis:
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1. Does changing conferences to a new conference, with higher prestige in football, benefit
schools through an increase in applications, admitted students, enrolled students, and
SAT scores of accepted students?
The institutions’ changing conferences data for one and three years after they changed
conferences were compared to all other FBS schools that did not change conferences during the
same timeframe and were competing in the FBS for at least three years.
The timeframes being used in this study are based on previous research. Toma and Cross
(1998) and Pope and Pope (2014) found applications are impacted immediately, one and three
years after a school’s success. Chung (2013) and Pope and Pope (2009) had similar findings in
relation to SAT scores. This study is examining if changing conferences has a statistical
relationship, one and three years later, on applicants following a school’s conference change.
Data Source and Sample
The sample for this study came from the NCAA Division I FBS, formerly Division I-A.
Data from 1998 to 2014 were used for this research. 1998 was selected as a starting point to
gather data, since this was the first year of the BCS. The BCS awarded six of the ten spots in
their bowl series to conference winners in the Power 5 conferences and the Big East. The other
four spots, or at-large bids, also frequently were awarded to non-conference winners in the
Power 5 conferences and the Big East. The BCS was the beginning of schools changing
conferences and conference realignment. Seven of the eight teams in the Big East would
eventually move to Power 5 conferences, ending the Big East as a football conference. 2014 was
the last year used for data, because the data were needed three years after conference movement.
2014 was also the last year used because only three total teams, two to more successful
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conferences, moved from 2015 to 2018. For the complete list of schools, their previous
conferences, and the conferences they moved to, please see Appendix A.
From 1998 to 2014, between 112 and 130 schools competed in the FBS each year,
totaling 2,022 observations. Between zero and 17 schools changed conferences each year,
totaling 85 changes, during this same time period. From the 130 schools, 58 schools changed
conferences, totaling 85 conference changes. Each of the 85 changes was examined to determine
if the movement was to a more or less successful conference, or to a newly formed conference.
Success was determined by a ranking system from www.sports-reference.com, and the system
was calculated by using three factors: the overall winning percentage against non-conference
opponents, Associated Press (AP) final Poll, and Simple Rating System (SRS) during the
previous football season (College Football Statistics and History, n.d.). The overall winning
percentage against non-conference opponents uses the win and loss record of each school’s game
against teams not in their conference. The AP Poll is a weekly ranking system of the top 25
NCAA teams in Division I. The polls are voted on by 65 sportswriters and broadcasters from the
entire nation (College Football Statistics and History, n.d.). SRS is a rating system that uses the
average point differential and strength of a team’s schedule (College Football Statistics and
History, n.d.). Overall conference ranking from 1997 to 2013 can be found in Appendix B.
A conference move in 1998 was determined to be a more successful conference based on
their 1997 conference ranking, and so on until 2014. If a school changed conferences to a less
successful conference, they were removed from the data set. The 2004 movement of the
University of Miami and Virginia Tech from the Big East Conference to the more prestigious
ACC provides an example of schools moving to a more prestigious conference. Conversely, in
2011 Nebraska moved from the more prestigious Big 12 Conference to the less prestigious Big
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Ten Conference. Schools were also included in the study if their move was to a newly formed
conference, if the newly formed conference was made up of teams which would have had a
higher ranking the previous year, according to the criteria used by www.sports-reference.com.
This resulted in the schools entering the Mountain West Conference from the Western Athletic
Conference in 1999, schools entering the Sun Belt Conference in 2001 from the Big West of
Independent Conferences, and schools entering the American Conference in 2013 from
Conference USA, to remain in the study. Schools in conferences that disbanded and no longer
competed in the FBS were included, if they entered an existing conference with a higher SRS
from the previous season, or if the schools competing in their new conference would have had a
higher conference ranking. As a result of this, the entire Big West Conference, six schools, in
2001 remained in the data set, while five schools leaving the Western Athletic Conference 2013
were removed from the data set. Twenty-one schools were not included in the study, because
they entered the FBS from the FCS. The study focuses on change of schools within the FBS
changing conferences, not the possible association of schools moving from FCS to FBS. After
removing schools based on this criterion, 43 teams remained in the data set. The 1,986 remaining
observations were also examined to determine if there was a statistical relationship for schools
remaining in their conference.
Treatment Group
The treatment group for this study is the 43 FBS schools that changed conferences to
more successful conferences from 1998 to 2014. The schools, at one and three full years after
they entered the new conference, will be compared to all other FBS schools that did not change
conferences during the same timeframe. This will help determine if there is a positive statistical
relationship to applicants, and SAT scores of accepted students. Schools whose conference
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movement was to a more successful conference can be found in Appendix C. The full list of all
schools changing conferences for each year can also be found in Appendix C. From 1998 to
2014, 14 total conferences competed in the FBS, with either 10 or 11 total conferences
competing each year. The full list of each conference and the years they were active in the FBS
can be found in Appendix D. The 43 schools used in this study entered eleven of the fourteen
conferences that competed in FBS from 1998 to 2014: American Athletic Conference, ACC, Big
East, Big Ten, Big 12, Conference USA, Independent, Mountain West Conference, Pac-12, Sun
Belt, and Western Athletic Conference. The only conferences that did not have teams leave (to
any other conference) during this time period were Big Ten Conference, Pac12 Conference, and
SEC; these conferences are generally viewed as the three most prestigious conferences. Although
all 14 conferences competing in FBS from 1998 to 2014 had new members enter, three of the 14
conferences only received new schools who were in more successful conferences the previous
year: Big West Conference, Mid-American Conference, and SEC; this affected 5 colleges.
Ten schools moved to more prestigious conferences more than once between 1998 and
2014. Seven schools changed conferences twice: BYU (1999, 2011), Utah (1999, 2011), Nevada
(2000, 2012), Louisiana Tech (2001, 2013), Louisville (2005, 2014), UCF (2005, 2014), and
Utah State (2005, 2013). Three schools changed conferences three times: Idaho (2001, 2005,
2013), TCU (2001, 2005, 2012), and New Mexico State (2001, 2005, 2013).
Comparison Group
Because the study focused on what, if any, effect changing football conferences has on a
school, a comparison group is needed to determine if there is any statistical relationship to
applicants after the conference change takes place. It is necessary to compare these trends in
order to establish causality. The schools in the control group came from the 128 schools, varying
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from 112 to 128 each season, in the 14 FBS conferences in the FBS from 1998 to 2014, that did
not move in that given year. This group was created by removing the 43 schools that changed
conferences, for the three years after they changed conferences. Schools were also removed for
three years from the data set if they entered the FBS between 1998 and 2017. This included 17
schools. The full list of each FBS school and the years they were active between 1998 and 2014
can be found in Appendix D.
Variables
Dependent
In order to determine the statistical relationship between FBS schools changing
conferences and application, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores, the following variables
were selected from IPEDS: applications, admitted students, enrolled students, and SAT scores,
for each year from 1998 to 2014.
Applications - This variable measured the total number of applicants: first-time, first-year
incoming students, not including transfer students, for the year prior to a school changing
conferences, and then one and three years after the school changed conferences. This time frame
was used to obtain a better understanding of the school’s applicant pool, and allows for change to
develop over time. The prior year was used as a control to show that schools changing
conferences were more successful in obtaining applicants than those that did not change.
Admitted Students- This variable measured the total number of students accepted the year prior
to changing conferences, and then one and three years after they changed conferences.
Enrolled students- This variable measured class size of first-time, first-year incoming students,
not including transfer students, one year prior, and one and three years after a conference change.

55

ACT/SAT Scores- The ACT and SAT have been considered the primary determining factor of
college readiness for students entering higher education. The majority of graduating high school
students from 1998 to 2014 took either the ACT or SAT (Zwick, 2017). This variable measured
the scores of the ACT and SAT of the incoming students one and three years after a conference
change compared to the ACT and SAT scores of incoming students in all other FBS schools not
changing conferences. The variables were continuous, and they were converted into a single
measurement by the higher percentage of students taking either assessment. If the same
percentage of first-time degree/certificate seeking students took the ACT and SAT, the SAT
score was used because it is taken by a greater number of students nationally (Zwick, 2017). The
variable was generated by using each year of scores separately. If a higher number of first-time
degree/certificate seeking students submitted SAT scores, an “average” score was found. To
obtain an “average” SAT score, the mean was found for the 25th and 75th percentile score for
mathematics, and the 25th and 75th percentile for reading. The sum of the mathematics and
reading scores was then used for the SAT score. If a higher number of first-time
degree/certificate seeking students submitted ACT scores, the scores were converted to SAT
equivalent scores using the ACT official website (ACT, 2019). The data were generated for all
schools in the same way, for the years 1998 to 2014.
Descriptive Statistics
The 85 total conference changes of FBS schools from 1998 to 2014 were completed by
58 different schools. Of the 58 schools changing conferences, 43 of those schools moved to more
prestigious conferences. Twenty-seven of the 58 schools moved to both more prestigious and
less prestigious conferences, and 15 schools moved to only less prestigious conferences. Tables
3, 4, 5, and 6 provide descriptive data for the year 2014 for each of these six subgroups, using the
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variables applicants, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores. The charts show the total number
(N), of schools for each group; the mean, the overall average for each group; the standard
deviation (SD), the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for each group; and
median, the middle number of each group when ordered from least to greatest, of each of the
four variables.
Table 3
Applications 2014
All schools

N
121

Mean
21596.92

SD
13552.39

Median
18320

Ever changed

57

16608.67

10356.25

14933

Never changed

64

26039.58

14558.29

21616

Moved up

43

16604.53

10886.01

12835

Moved down

14

16621.36

8896.39

14938.5

Moved up and
down

26

15799.88

8796.97

14578

The difference between the mean and median for All schools, Ever changed, Never changed, and
Moved up indicated the skewness was a large number. This is discussed further below.
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Table 4
Admissions 2014
All schools

N
121

Mean
11413.32

SD
5853.48

Median
11265

Ever changed

57

9633.37

5495.8

8293

Never changed

64

12998.59

5744.22

12698.5

Moved up

43

9586.07

5403.96

7897

Moved down

14

9778.64

5977.54

9080

Moved up and
down

26

9331.31

5475.77

8185.5

Schools that did not change conferences between 1998 and 2014 admitted 12.12% more students
than any other group for the 2014 year.
Table 5
Enrollment 2014
All schools

N
121

Mean
3979.56

SD
1879.22

Median
3811

Ever changed

57

3392.51

1783.05

3254

Never changed

64

4502.41

1819.36

4169.5

Moved up

43

3215.88

1434.71

3158

Moved down

14

3750.71

2619.53

3370

Moved up and
down

26

3494.81

2179.68

3195

The admissions of increase in admissions was similar to the percentage of increase in enrollment.
Schools that did not change conferences between 1998 and 2014 enrolled 11.61% more students
than any other group for the 2014 year.
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Table 6
SAT Score 2014
N
117

Mean
1178.89

SD
123.82

Median
1170

Ever changed

55

1152.45

119.29

1130

Never changed

62

1202.34

123.96

1197.5

Moved up

42

1151.67

114

1147.5

Moved down

13

1155

140.09

1110

Moved up and
down

25

1153

124.24

1110

All schools

Schools that did not change conferences between 1998 and 2014 had a slightly higher (47.34
points) mean SAT score than any other group for the 2014 year.
In each of the four categories, schools that did not change conferences had the greatest
mean score. Schools not changing conferences had 20% more incoming students than any other
group. In general, the schools in the Never Changed group are from the Power 5 conferences.
Teams in Power 5 conferences traditionally do not leave their conferences. Of the 85 total
changes from 1998 to 2014, only five were moves leaving the Power 5 conferences, these five
moments were to all to other Power 5 conferences. The difference between the mean and median
for applicants and enrollment among All schools, Ever changed, Never changed, and Moved up
indicated the skewness was a large number. Each group had a skew score >1.20 for applicants.
Moved up, Moved down, and Moved up and down each had a skew > 1.30 for enrollment. With
a skewness greater than 1, the distribution is highly skewed. This also suggests the mean of the
data value is larger than the median (Sullivan, 2008). This confirms the variables needed to be
logged when running regressions. The descriptive statistics for applications, admissions,
enrollment, and SAT scores appeared to have a skewed distribution. The skewness was checked
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for each group for all years in the data set. Since the applicants and admissions were skewed,
yield rates and admittance rates (admit rate) were used. Admissions rates were found by dividing
the number of applicants by the admissions and multiplying by 100. Yield rates were found by
dividing the number of enrollments by the number of admissions and multiplying by 100. Using
the admission rates and yield rates will break any collinearity issues. The histograms in
Appendices E, F, and G display skewness for applications, admissions, and enrollment. As a
result of this, the variables were logged.
Table 7 displays the correlations between applications, admissions, enrollment, and SAT
scores. The correlation between admissions and applicants, admissions and enrolled, and
applicants and enrolled, were all greater than 0.5.
Table 7
The Correlations Between Admissions, Applicants, SAT Scores, and Enrollment

Admissions

Admissions
1.000

Applicants
0.668

SAT
0.001

Enrolled
0.857

Yield Rate
-0.530

Admit Rate
0.150

Applicants

0.668

1.000

0.398

0.519

-.0381

-0.512

SAT

0.001

0.398

1.000

-0.016

-0.049

-0.604

Enrolled

0.857

0.519

-0.016

1.000

-0.134

0.201

Yield Rate

-0.530

-0.381

-0.0492

-0.134

1.000

-0.081

Admit Rate

0.150

-0.512

-0.604

0.201

-0.081

1.000
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Table 8
Yield Rate 2014
N
121

Mean
38.45

SD
13.57

Median
36.37

Ever changed

57

39.81

16.03

35.51

Never changed

64

37.25

10.92

35.91

Moved up

43

39.85

16.51

36.46

Moved down

14

39.67

15.06

38.67

Moved up and
down

26

40.42

15.04

39.07

N
121

Mean
60.1

SD
22.61

Median
62.99

Ever changed

57

62.8

20.64

65.38

Never changed

64

57.68

24.13

59.58

Moved up

43

63.17

19.98

65.03

Moved down

14

61.68

23.32

67.96

Moved up and
down

26

62.8

22.68

65.71

All schools

Table 9
Admittance Rate 2014
All schools

Tables 7 through 9 show there are no major collinearity issues. The correlations are more
modest.
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Methods
The study looked at the schools one and three full years after they entered the new
conference, compared to all other FBS schools that did not change conferences during the same
timeframe. This helped determine if conference change has a positive impact on applicants,
admitted students, enrolled students, and ACT/SAT scores of accepted students. This time frame
was used to obtain a better understanding of the school’s applicant pool and allows for change to
develop over time. The schools not changing conferences were used as a control to show that
schools changing conferences were more successful in obtaining applicants than those that did
not change. Admitted students were measured by the total number of students accepted
compared the number of students accepted to all schools that did not change conferences.
Enrolled students were measured by the class size of the incoming students compared to the class
size of the incoming students at all schools that did not change conferences. SAT scores were
measured by the average of the 25th and 75th percentile scores. When running generalized linear
regressions, control variables were used for the prior year’s values of the dependent variables:
applications, admitted rates, yield rates, and ACT and SAT scores. This process was repeated for
the years of the study, 1999-2017. Generalized linear regressions were used because the samples
in this study were either teams that moved to a more prestigious conference or teams that did not
move to a more prestigious conference. Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) established generalized
linear regressions as an addition to linear regression models. This study includes multiple
variables over several years; therefore, this analysis fits as it models repeated measures.
Limitations
Potential limitations of this study include the notion that this study only examined
institutions competing in the FBS. Therefore, this study may not be applied to schools in the
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FCS, Division II, or Division III. By only including schools taking part in the FBS, this study
only looks at the effects of conference movement on schools with major college football
programs. However, schools not competing in the FBS have less visibility and are not impacted
in the same way as FBS schools are (Pope & Pope, 2009).
Kramer (2016) found that schools attempted to move conferences to increase visibility
and increase the quality of academics through incoming students. Although Kramer’s research
was thorough, the case study involved only three schools. Of the 58 schools changing
conferences, we are unaware of the reason for each school’s movement. Perhaps they were not
interested in an increase in applications, admittance rate, enrollment, and SAT scores. Another
limitation could involve the reason for movement. Not all conference changes were initiated by
each specific school. Some schools changed conferences because their conference was
disbanded. An example would be the Western Athletic Conference after the 2013 season. For a
complete list of conferences for each season, please see Appendix B.
Another limitation could be the potential financial restrictions from each institution.
Students may have been more likely to apply; however, the lack of financial aid, or lack of
information about possible financial aid available to each student at each potential school, may
have hindered their application process, which in turn could have affected admissions and
enrollment.
Although in the majority of cases universities’ other athletic programs also changed
conferences, the study focused on the movement in relation to football. Schools generally
changed conferences to reap the benefits of their new football affiliation. The University of
Maryland and Syracuse University both recently won National Championships in men’s
basketball; however, their basketball teams were an afterthought when they both left their
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conferences for more prestigious football conferences (McMurphy, 2019). Therefore, if a
school’s applications, admitted students, enrollment, or SAT score was increasing, it may have
been a result of their success in other athletics.
Conferences’ prestige was determined by using the following factors: the overall winning
percentage against non-conference opponents, Associated Press (AP) final poll, and Simple
Rating System (SRS), from the previous year. Not taking several previous years into account to
determine prestige could have been a possible limitation. In 2011, Nebraska moved from the Big
12 Conference to the historically more prestigious Big Ten Conference; however, the Big 12
Conference had a higher ranking in 2010, so the move was deemed as a move to a less
prestigious conference in this study.
Although controlled for in regard to football, in addition to conference change, an
institution may have experienced unexpected success in another sport, which may have affected
their application pool. Schools have experienced an increase in applications following the
unexpected success of their men’s basketball team in the NCAA tournament; these schools are
referred to as Cinderella schools (Childs, 2018).
Another limitation was the length of time used. Although the years used in the study were
chosen based on previous research, the study only examined one and three years after the
conference movement. Along with one year, three years was also used, because unlike
unexpected success on the field, schools would need a longer amount of time to obtain the
perceived prestige from their new conference affiliation. Toma and Cross (1998) found that most
schools experienced a three-year increase in applications when their victory was unexpected or
was highlighted by a unique story garnering national media coverage. Pope and Pope (2014)
found that applications are mostly impacted three years after a school’s success. Chung (2013)
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and Pope and Pope (2008) found that applicants’ SAT scores are impacted three years following
a school’s conference change.
In previous research, the increase or decrease of donations was used as a variable, but this
study did not use donations as a variable. Donations were not used as a variable in this study
because the majority of previous research found that increased donations as a result of athletic
success normally occur immediately following athletic success, while this study looked at a
statistical relationship after one and three years (Seltzer, 2018).
Although the vast majority of schools reported data for each category in each year, some
schools did not report data for each category for each year. For example, Duke University did not
report applications for 2001, and Wake Forest University, the University of Arizona, and Kansas
State University did not report SAT or ACT scores for several years. Schools not reporting data
were excluded from the study during the years they did not report.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The research question focuses on if the movement between athletic conferences of FBS
schools has an association with their applications, enrollment, admissions, and SAT scores. The
results of this study are presented in this chapter to show the changes an institution experiences
one and three years after moving to a more prestigious conference. Additionally, a comparison
group of all FBS schools that did not move to more prestigious conferences during this time
provides a better understanding of the relationship of moving to a more prestigious conference
has on a school versus not moving to a more prestigious conference.
Regression Results
The research question which guided this study was: Does changing conferences to a new
conference, with higher prestige in football, benefit schools through a statistical increase in
applications, admitted students, enrollment, and SAT scores of accepted students? In order to
answer this question, the dependent variables were analyzed while controlling for logged
applicants, admittance rate, yield rates, and SAT scores. Generalized linear regressions were run
for schools moving to more prestigious conferences looking one and three years after a team’s
move.
The tables are presented in the order of applications, admissions, enrollment, and SAT
scores, based on the likelihood of a statistical relationship to each area. Research has found that
an increase in applications is the most likely area to be affected by athletic success (Chung,
2013). Potential students, no matter their past academic achievement, are exposed to a school
though their athletic programs, and apply to the school. In turn, admissions is the next potential
category to be affected. If there are more applicants, the school can admit more students. If more
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students are admitted, more students can be enrolled. SAT is thought to be the last category
affected; as numbers increase, there is potential for students with higher academic achievement
to enroll.
Table 10
One-Year Lagged Outcome: Applications
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

Moved to
more
prestigious

0.019

0.021

0.906

0.365

Log
Applications

0.931

0.022

41.833

<0.001

Admit rate

0.002

0.001

3.976

<0.001

Yield Rate

0.002

0.001

2.844

0.0045

SATs

0.001

0.000

5.227

<0.001

Table 11
Three-Year Lagged Outcome: Applications
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

Moved to
more
prestigious

0.016

0.0389

0.415

0.678

Log
Applications

0.694

0.038

18.356

<0.001

Admit rate

0.002

0.001

2.567

0.010

Yield Rate

0.000

0.001

0.510

0.610

SATs

0.002

0.002

6.602

<0.001
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In Tables 10 and 11, I examined the effect of changing conferences one and three years
later on the number of applications, after controlling for the number of logged applications, the
admittance rate, the yield rate, and SAT scores in the prior year. Schools moving to more
prestigious conferences experienced a 0.019 change after one year, and a 0.016 change after
three years, showing an increase of 1.9% and 1.6%. After accounting for the previous year’s
characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient gives an increase in applicants. Logged
applicants gives 93.1%, admittance rate gives 0.2%, yield rate gives 0.2%, and SAT scores gives
0.1%. After accounting for the prior year’s characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient
is associated with an increase in the number of applicants three years later. Logged applicants
gives 69.4%, admittance rate gives 0.2%, yield rate gives less than 0.001%, and SAT scores
gives 0.2%. If any area was thought to have a significant increase, it was applications. However,
no significant increase in applications one year or three years after a move was found for schools
moving to a more prestigious conference. In the one-year model, the previous year’s logged
applications, admittance rate, yield rate, and SATs were all found to be significant. After three
years, yield rate was not found to be significant, but logged applications, admittance rate, and
SATs were found to be significant. The majority of research on the association between
collegiate athletics and academics pertains to applications. Going back to the 1980s the idea of
the Flutie Effect was thought to have the greatest association with applications (Chung, 2013).
However, there was no significant statistical relationship found with applicants in this study.
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Table 12
One-Year Lagged Outcome: Admissions
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

Moved to
more
prestigious

0.019

0.021

0.906

0.365

Log
Applications

0.931

0.022

41.833

<0.001

Admit rate

0.002

0.001

3.976

<0.001

Yield Rate

0.002

0.001

2.844

0.004

SATs

0.001

0.000

5.227

<0.001

Table 13
Three-Year Lagged Outcome: Admissions
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

-0.022

0.035

-0.643

0.520

Log
Applications

0.384

0.034

11.224

<0.001

Admit rate

0.001

0.001

1.104

0.270

Yield Rate

-0.002

0.001

-2.624

0.009

0.001

0.000

6.251

<0.001

Moved to
more
prestigious

SATs

In Tables 12 and 13, I examined the effect of changing conferences one and three years
later on the number of admissions, after controlling for the number of logged applications, the
admittance rate, the yield rate, and SAT scores in the prior year. Schools moving to more
prestigious conferences experienced a 0.019 change after one year, and a -0.022 change after
three years, showing an increase of 1.9% and decrease of 2.2%. After accounting for the
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previous year’s characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient gives an increase in
admissions. Logged applicants gives 93.1%, admittance rate gives 0.2%, yield rate gives 0.2%,
and SAT scores gives 0.1%. After accounting for the prior year’s characteristics, a one-unit
increase in each coefficient is associated with an increase in the number of admissions three
years later. Logged applicants gives 38.4%, admittance rate gives 0.1%, yield rate gives -0.2%,
and SAT scores gives 0.1%.
The results indicate moving to a more prestigious conference does not significantly
increase admission rates one or three years after a move. In the one-year model, the previous
year’s logged applications, admittance rate, yield rate, and SATs were all found to be significant.
After three years, admittance rate was not found to be significant, but logged applications, yield
rate, and SATs were found to be significant.
The findings of no significance on the increase of applications suggested there would not
be an increase in admissions. Without an increase in applicants, it would be difficult for a school
to increase their accepted students.
Table 14
One-Year Lagged Outcome: Enrollment
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

Moved to
more
prestigious

0.006

0.018

0.031

0.976

Log
Applications

0.461

0.019

24.353

<0.001

Admit rate

0.007

0.001

13.069

<0.001

Yield Rate

0.007

0.001

11.835

<0.001

-0.000

0.000

-1.177

0.239

SATs

70

Table 15
Three-Year Lagged Outcome: Enrollment
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

T-Value

Sig.

Moved to
more
prestigious

0.001

0.024

0.044

0.965

Log
Applications

0.218

0.023

9.367

<0.001

Admit rate

0.002

0.001

2.732

0.007

Yield Rate

0.001

0.001

1.609

0.108

SATs

0.000

0.000

1.865

0.062

In Tables 14 and 15, I examined the effect of changing conferences one and three years
later on the number of enrollments, after controlling for the number of logged applications, the
admittance rate, the yield rate, and SAT scores in the prior year. Schools moving to more
prestigious conferences experienced a 0.006 change after one year, and 0.001 change after three
years, showing an increase of 0.6% and decrease of 0.1%. After accounting for the previous
year’s characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient gives an increase in enrollment.
Logged applicants gives 46.1%, admittance rate gives 0.7%, yield rate gives 0.7%, and SAT
scores gives a negative percent greater than -0.01%. After accounting for the prior year’s
characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient is associated with an increase in the
number of enrollments three years later. Logged applicants gives 21.8%, admittance rate gives
0.2%, yield rate gives 0.1%, and SAT scores gives less than 0.01%.
Moving to a more prestigious conference was not found to have a statistically significant
association with student enrollment. In the one-year model, the previous year’s logged
applications, admittance rate, and SATs were found to be significant, and yield rate was not.
71

After three years, logged applications and admittance rate were found to be significant, while
yield rate and SAT were not found to be significant.
The results indicate that the enrollment of the freshman class is not changing one year
after conference movement. Previous research has found success leads to greater enrollment
within the first year (Anderson, 2017). Three years following movement did not result in any
statistically significant findings. This could suggest that potential incoming students are not
aware of and have no association with conference change; however, the lack of significance
within one or three years after movements suggests that potential students may not be influenced
for up to three years. Theoretically, there could be an effect even if the number of students
admitted did not change. Schools can have a fixed number of students admitted for a particular
year, regardless of the number of applications they receive. However, the 1.9% increase in
applicants after one year and 1.6% increase after three years could suggest that students may
have been more likely to attend but were not admitted.
Table 16
One-Year Lagged Outcome: SAT
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

2.323

3.083

0.753

0.451

Log
Applications

21.284

2.298

6.459

<0.001

Admit rate

-0.014

0.093

-0.154

0.878

Yield Rate

-0.032

0.091

-0.346

0.729

0.625

0.022

28.002

<0.001

Moved to
more
prestigious

SATs

T-Value
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Sig.

Table 17
Three-Year Lagged Outcome: SAT
Controls

Estimate

Standard Error

1.296

4.606

0.281

0.779

41.315

4.527

9.127

<0.001

Admit rate

0.118

0.120

0.980

0.327

Yield Rate

0.145

0.117

1.242

0.214

SATs

0.322

0.031

10.5527

<0.001

Moved to
more
prestigious
Log
Applications

T-Value

Sig.

In Tables 16 and 17, I examined the effect of changing conferences one and three years
later on the SAT scores, after controlling for the number of logged applications, The admittance
rate, the yield rate, and SAT scores in the prior year. Unlike in Tables 10 through 15, for the
variables applications, admissions, and enrollment, the results in Tables 16 and 17 are points, not
percentages. SAT scores moving to more prestigious conferences experienced an increase of
2.323 points after one year, and a 1.296-point change after three years. After accounting for the
previous year’s characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient gives an increase in SAT
scores. Logged applicants gives a 21.284-point change, admittance rate gives a -0.014-point
change, yield rate gives a -0.32-point change, and SAT scores gives a 0.625-point change. After
accounting for the prior year’s characteristics, a one-unit increase in each coefficient is
associated with an increase in the SAT scores three years later. Logged applicants gives a
41.315-point change, admittance rate gives a 0.118-point change, yield rate gives a 0.145-point
change, and SAT scores gives a 0.322-point change.
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The results indicate that FBS schools moving to more prestigious conferences do not see
a significant increase in SAT score one year after a move. In the one-year model, the previous
year’s logged applications and SAT scores were found to be significant, and admittance and
yield rates were not found to be significant. After three years, logged applications and SAT
scores were found to be significant, while admittance rates and yield rates were not found to be
significant.
Based on previous research, these results differed from what was expected. Although the
study took place over 25 years ago, and arguably examined more events, Tucker and Amato
(1993) found that SAT scores increase immediately after a school’s athletic success, defined as
finishing in the Top 10 in the final football rankings. As with one year later, there was no
significance found three years following movement for SAT scores. Research also suggested
there would be a statistical relationship within three years of movement. Pope and Pope (2009)
found success in basketball, reaching the Final Four, was associated with an increase in SAT
scores within the first three years.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to try to determine what academic factors are associated
with the movement of FBS schools to more prestigious conferences. The outcomes for these
schools were not found to be statistically significant when measuring for a school’s movement
one and three years after their move. This chapter attempted to answer the research question
guiding this study. The findings presented in this chapter gave a statistical analysis of
applications, admitted students, enrolled students, and SAT scores, for FBS schools one and
three years after their movement to a more prestigious conference. The results proved that none
of these areas has a significant statistical relationship. This suggests that changing to a more
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prestigious conference is not associated with a school’s incoming students one or three years
after their move. Chapter 5 concludes these findings and provides implications of this study and
suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to determine the statistical relationship, if any, between
NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools changing their football conference
and application, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores, and the majority of research has been
qualitative. Most recently, Kramer (2016) conducted a case study involving FBS institutions,
interviewing administrators and faculty members, in order to determine why their school
changed conferences. This study was vastly different; this study used a quantitative approach to
look at admissions, both in number of applications and SAT scores of accepted students. This
study is even more innovative in design as it used a ranking system to determine conference
prestige. The system was calculated by using three factors: the overall winning percentage
against non-conference opponents, Associated Press (AP) final poll, and Simple Rating System
(SRS) during the previous football season. Lastly, most studies analyzing the association of
conference movement center on immediate results. This study focuses on the results one and
three years after a school’s move to a more prestigious conference, allowing for a more
pragmatic look at the long-term relationship moving to a more prestigious conference has on
application, admissions, enrollment, and SAT scores at FBS schools.
Summary of Results
The sample in this study came from the NCAA Division I FBS, formerly Division I-A,
specifically, from the years 1998 to 2014. During this time frame, between 112 and 130 schools
competed in the FBS each year, totaling 2,022 observations. From the 130 schools, there were
between zero and 17 school conference changes each year; 58 schools changed conferences,
totaling 85 overall conference changes. All of the 85 changes were examined to determine if
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their movement was to a more or less successful conference. Forty-three of these moves were to
more successful conferences. While Kramer (2016) found one of the reasons for changing
conferences was to increase visibility and the quality of academics, through incoming students,
this study did not find any statistical relationship between schools moving to a more prestigious
football conference and applications, admittance, enrollment, and SAT scores. Based on previous
research, if at least one area was thought to have a statistical relationship, it was admissions
(Chung, 2013; Conn, 2014; Dosh, 2012; McDonald, 2003; McEvoy, 2005). This was not the
case.
Implications of the Study
The intention of this study was to determine if moving to a more prestigious FBS
conference had a positive relationship to a school’s incoming applicants, accepted students,
enrollment, or SAT scores. Although no effect was found, this study was significant due to the
popularity of college football and the impact it has on institutions. Football, especially among
FBS schools, is the most visible and influential sport on college campuses (Won & Chelladurai,
2016). Success in football has impacted admissions, donations, and overall reputation.
Institutions have changed their athletic football conferences to obtain these positive effects. Due
to expiring television contracts with Fox and ESPN, it is predicted that there will be significant
and profound movement of FBS schools to different conferences in 2023 and 2035 (Rittenberg,
2017). The findings in this study will benefit a multitude of universities as they approach their
future decision-making.
Recent studies have found that goals for schools changing conferences include increasing
and impacting the quality of academics (Kogan & Greyser, 2014; Kramer, 2016). This study has
found that changing conferences does not have a statistical relationship with either of these
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issues within the first three years of moving. Institutional leaders should take this into account
when planning future movement and when setting their expectations following their movement.
Suggestions for Future Research
As previously mentioned, one possible reason for not finding a statistical relationship is
the length of time used in the study. The literature supports using one and three years after
movement to obtain an understanding of the relationship; however, one or three years may not be
a sufficient amount of time when looking at conference movement. Changing athletic
conferences is a recent phenomenon; therefore, the long-term effects of changing conferences
have not been fully examined.
Future research could examine student retention and graduation rates. After changing
conferences to a more prestigious conference, are schools more or less likely to have a higher
student retention and/or graduation rate?
One reason for wanting to move to a new, more prestigious conference is to be viewed
and regarded in the same manner as the schools in the conference the school is joining. However,
one of the attractive characteristics of the historically more prestigious and well-known
conferences is their history. If we look at the University of Nebraska and the University of
Maryland, they joined The Big Ten Conference in 2011 and 2014 respectively, nine and six
years ago, three times and twice as long as the amount of time used in this study. After six and
nine years, is either school viewed by the public as a “Big Ten school?” Are they still viewed as
schools from the Big 12 and the ACC? The Big Ten was founded in the 1800s. Is three years, six
years, or even nine years a long enough time period to determine the relationship of changing
conferences? Perhaps the greater effect is more likely to be among universities that may not have
been as well-known and associated with their previous conference. Future research can examine
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and attempt to determine if schools that changed conferences are viewed as members of their
new conference. Also, future research could investigate whether public perception sees schools
in the same way as their conference partners, or at least as being more prestigious than the
conference they left.
With the outcomes of this study not finding statistical significance when measuring for a
school’s movement, it raises the question: why are schools leaving their conferences, paying
multi-million-dollar exiting fees, and dismissing years of traditions in their former conferences,
to join new conferences? Future research should examine if there are other outcomes of changing
conferences, including changes in athletic program revenue and athletics-specific donations.
For the purpose of this study, the focus was how conference movements are associated
with academics. However, Kramer (2016) found that when changing conferences, the area of
greatest importance to institutions was increased revenue. In 2019, Rutgers University, who
joined the Big Ten in 2014, rehired their former head coach, Greg Schiano, to a $32 million
contract. Rutgers and Mr. Schiano came to an agreement on their new football facilities, which
are estimated to cost over $150 million. If Mr. Schiano can raise one half of the $150 million,
Rutgers will provide the other half of the money. Rutgers has not financially benefited from their
move to the Big Ten; they are ranked last in revenue in their conferences, and they did not see
the increase in donations they expected. Rutgers will not receive the full Big Ten revenue sharing
until 2027. Rutgers has reported that their lack of success in the Big Ten has negatively affected
them among alumni (O’Neill, 2019). Rutgers has a combined record of four wins and 40 losses
in Big Ten play since joining the conference in 2014. The university’s move to the historically
prestigious Big Ten Conference did not appear to result in a change to the trends within their
university in the areas of applications, accepted students, enrollment, or SAT scores (see Figure
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1). However, it would be hard to argue the change did not impact the hiring of a new coach and
allotment of funds to their football program. Potential future research could examine the impact
on schools’ athletic budgets after conference movement. Future studies could also examine if a
school has performed well enough to be viewed as a legitimate member of the new conference.
Figure 1
Rutgers University SAT Scores, Applications, Accepted Students, and Enrollment

Conclusion
The study has attempted to show the academic factors that change due to conference
movement among NCAA Division I FBS schools. The model used in this study can be beneficial
to the majority of influencers in higher education, and by the leaders on campuses throughout the
country, as they seek to better determine and understand the possible association, or lack of
association, changing conferences can have on a school’s academics. Institutions may decide to
lessen their expectations, or increase the time in which they are expecting change, after
80

conference movement. They may also look to examine the financial outcomes of changing
conferences of other schools before setting their own potential outlooks. This study suggests that
if a school is interested in changing FBS conferences, they should temper their expectations
within the first three years. It also suggests they should focus on potential financial impacts. This
study adds to existing literature on the relationship collegiate athletics, especially football, has to
its school. The relationship to academics of the school that changes conferences may not have
been seen within three years, but this study opened the door for future research on the topic.
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Appendix A
Schools Used in the Study from 1998 to 2014

First Schools
Year Changing
Play- Conferences
ing
in
New
Conf.

School

Previous Conference to New
Conference

1998

1

Army

(Independent) to (C-USA)

1999

10

Air Force

(WAC) to (MWC)

BYU

(WAC) to (MWC)

Colorado State

(WAC) to (MWC)

New Mexico

(WAC) to (MWC)

San Diego State

(WAC) to (MWC)

UNLV

(WAC) to (MWC)

Utah

(WAC) to (MWC)

Wyoming

(WAC) to (MWC)

Arkansas State

(Independent) to (Big West)

UAB

(Independent) to (C-USA)

Nevada

(Big West to WAC)

Arkansas State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

New Mexico State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

North Texas

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Louisiana-Lafayette

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

2000

1

2001

11
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Louisiana-Monroe

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Middle Tennessee State

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Boise State

(Big West) to (WAC)

Utah State

(Big West) to (Independent)

TCU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Louisiana Tech

(Independent) to (WAC)

2002

1

UCF

(Independent) to (MAC)

2003

2

USF

(Independent) to (C-USA)

Utah State

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

Miami

(Big East) to (ACC)

Virginia Tech

(Big East) to (ACC)

Troy

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

UConn

(Independent) to (Big East)

Army

(C-USA) to (Independent)

Cincinnati

(C-USA) to (Big East)

Louisville

(C-USA) to (Big East)

USF

(C-USA) to (Big East)

TCU

(C-USA) to (Mountain West)

Marshall

(MAC) to (C-USA)

UCF

(MAC) to (C-USA)

Tulsa

(WAC) to (C-USA)

UTEP

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Rice

(WAC) to (C-USA)

2004

2005

4

16

91

SMU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Boston College

(Big East) to (ACC)

Temple

(Big East) to (Independent)

Idaho

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

New Mexico State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

Utah State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

2006

0

2007

1

Temple

(Independent) to (MAC)

2008

1

Western Kentucky

(Independent) to (Sun Belt)

2009

0

2010

0

2011

5

Colorado

(Big 12) to (Pac-12)

Nebraska

(Big 12) to (Big Ten)

Utah

(MWC) to (Pac-12)

BYU

(MWC) to (Independent)

Boise State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas A&M

(Big 12) to (SEC)

Missouri

(Big 12) to (SEC)

West Virginia

(Big East) to (Big 12)

TCU

(MWC) to (Big 12)

Temple

(MAC) to (Big East)

Fresno State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Hawaii

(WAC) to (MWC)

Nevada

(WAC) to (MWC)

2012

8
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2013

2014

17

7

Syracuse

(Big East) to (ACC)

Pitt

(Big East) to (ACC)

UCF

(C-USA) to (American)

Houston

(C-USA) to (American)

Memphis

(C-USA) to (American)

SMU

(C-USA) to (American)

Middle Tennessee (State)

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

FAU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

FIU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

North Texas

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

Texas-San Antonio

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Louisiana Tech

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Utah State

(WAC) to (MWC)

San Jose State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas State

(WAC) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

(WAC) to (Independent)

New Mexico State

(WAC) to (Independent)

Maryland

(ACC to Big Ten)

Rutgers

(American to Big Ten)

Louisville

(American to ACC)

East Carolina

(American to C-USA)

Tulsa

(American to C-USA)

Tulane

(American to C-USA)

Western Kentucky

(Sun Belt to American)
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Appendix B
1997 to 2014 Conference Rankings
Conference rankings determined by overall winning percentage against non-conference
opponents. Associated Press final Poll, and Simple Rating System (SRS) (College Football
Statistics and History, n.d.)
1997 Season
1

Southeastern Conference (SEC)

2

Pac-10 Conference (Pac-10)

3

Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC)

4

Big Ten Conference (Big 10)

5

Big 12 Conference (Big 12)

6

Conference USA (C-USA)

7

Western Athletic Conference (WAC)

8

Big East Conference (Big East)

9

Mid-American Conference (MAC)

10

Independent

11

Big West Conference (Big West)

1998 Season
1

Big 12

2

Big 10

3

Pac-10

4

SEC

5

ACC

6

Big East

7

C-USA

94

8

WAC

9

Independent

10

Big West

11

MAC

1999 Season
1

Big 10

2

SEC

3

ACC

4

Big 12

5

Pac-10

6

Big East

7

Mountain West Conference (Mountain West)

8

C-USA

9

WAC

10

Independent

11

Big West

12

MAC

2000 Season
1

Pac-10

2

Big East

3

Big 12

4

SEC

5

Big 10

6

ACC

95

7

C-USA

8

Mountain West

9

WAC

10

MAC

11

Big West

12

Independent

2001 Season
1

SEC

2

Big 12

3

Pac-10

4

Big East

5

Big 10

6

ACC

7

Mountain West

8

C-USA

9

WAC

10

Independent

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt Conference (Sun Belt)

2002 Season
1

Pac-10

2

SEC

3

Big 12

4

Big 10

96

5

ACC

6

Big East

7

Independent

8

Mountain West

9

C-USA

10

MAC

11

WAC

12

Sun Belt

2003 Season
1

SEC

2

ACC

3

Big 10

4

Big 12

5

Pac-10

6

Big East

7

Mountain West

8

Independent

9

C-USA

10

WAC

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt

2004 Season
1

Pac-10

2

ACC

97

3

Big 12

4

Big 10

5

SEC

6

Mountain West

7

Big East

8

WAC

9

C-USA

10

Independent

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt

2005 Season
1

Big 10

2

ACC

3

Pac-10

4

Big 12

5

SEC

6

Big East

7

Independent

8

Mountain West

9

C-USA

10

MAC

11

WAC

12

Sun Belt

2006 Season

98

1

SEC

2

Big East

3

Pac-10

4

Big 10

5

Big 12

6

ACC

7

Mountain West

8

WAC

9

C-USA

10

Independent

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt

2007 Season
1

SEC

2

Pac-10

3

Big East

4

Big 12

5

ACC

6

Big 10

7

Mountain West

8

WAC

9

Independent

10

C-USA

11

Sun Belt

12

MAC
99

2009 Season
1

SEC

2

Big East

3

ACC

4

Big 12

5

Pac-10

6

Big 10

7

Mountain West

8

Independent

9

WAC

10

C-USA

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt

2010 Season
1

Pac-10

2

SEC

3

Big 12

4

ACC

5

Big 10

6

Independent

7

Big East

8

WAC

9

Mountain West

10

C-USA
100

11

MAC

12

Sun Belt

2011 Season
1

Big 12

2

SEC

3

Big 10

4

Pacific 12 Conference (Pac-12, formerly Pac-10)

5

Big East

6

ACC

7

Independent

8

Mountain West

9

MAC

10

C-USA

11

WAC

12

Sun Belt

2012 Season
1

SEC

2

Big 12

3

Pac-12

4

Big 10

5

Independent

6

ACC

7

Big East

8

WAC

101

9

Sun Belt

10

Mountain West

11

C-USA

12

MAC

2013 Season
1

Pac-12

2

SEC

3

Big 12

4

Big 10

5

ACC

6

American Athletic Conference (American)

7

Mountain West

8

Independent

9

Sun Belt

10

C-USA

11

MAC

102

Appendix C
Conference Movement
Schools who had conference movement and if their movement was to a more successful
conference.
First
Year in
new
Conf.

Sc School
ho
ols
cha
ngi
ng
con
fer
enc
es

Previous Conference to
New Conference

Schools whose new
conference had a higher
ranking the previous
season.
Schools whose
conferences no longer
completed in FBS are also
included, as long as their
new conference is a more
prestigious conference.
Schools who moved to
newly formed
conferences are also
included, as long as their
new conference is a more
prestigious conference.

1998

1

Army

(Independent) to (C-USA)

Army

1999

10

Air Force

(WAC) to (MWC)

Air Force

BYU

(WAC) to (MWC)

BYU

Colorado State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Colorado State

New Mexico

(WAC) to (MWC)

New Mexico

San Diego State

(WAC) to (MWC)

San Diego State

UNLV

(WAC) to (MWC)

UNLV

Utah

(WAC) to (MWC)

Utah

Wyoming

(WAC) to (MWC)

Wyoming

Arkansas State

(Independent) to (Big
West)

UAB

(Independent) to (C-USA)
103

*Mountain West was a
newly formed conference

2000

1

Nevada

(Big West to WAC)

Nevada

2001

11

Arkansas State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Arkansas State

Idaho

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

New Mexico State

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

New Mexico State

North Texas

(Big West) to (Sun Belt)

North Texas

Louisiana-Lafayette

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)

Louisiana-Lafayette

Louisiana-Monroe

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)

Louisiana-Monroe

Middle Tennessee
State

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)

Middle Tenn State

Boise State

(Big West) to (WAC)

Boise State

Utah State

(Big West) to
(Independent)

TCU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

TCU

Louisiana Tech

(Independent) to (WAC)

Louisiana Tech

*Sun Belt was a newly
formed conference.
2002

1

UCF

(Independent) to (MAC)

none

2003

2

USF

(Independent) to (C-USA)

none

Utah State

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)

Miami

(Big East) to (ACC)

Miami

Virginia Tech

(Big East) to (ACC)

Virginia Tech

2004

4

Troy

104

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)
UConn

UConn
(Independent) to (Big
East)

2005

16

Army

(C-USA) to (Independent)

Cincinnati

(C-USA) to (Big East)

Cincinnati

Louisville

(C-USA) to (Big East)

Louisville

USF

(C-USA) to (Big East)

USF

TCU

(C-USA) to (Mountain
West)

TCU

Marshall

(MAC) to (C-USA)

Marshall

UCF

(MAC) to (C-USA)

UCF

Tulsa

(WAC) to (C-USA)

UTEP

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Rice

(WAC) to (C-USA)

SMU

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Boston College

(Big East) to (ACC)

Temple

(Big East) to
(Independent)

Idaho

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

Idaho

New Mexico State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

New Mexico State

Utah State

(Sun Belt) to (WAC)

Utah State

Boston College

2006

0

none

2007

1

Temple

(Independent) to (MAC)

none

2008

1

Western Kentucky

(Independent) to (Sun
Belt)

none
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2009

0

none

2010

0

none

2011

5

2012

2013

8

17

Colorado

(Big 12) to (Pac-12)

Nebraska

(Big 12) to (Big Ten)

Utah

(MWC) to (Pac-12)

Utah

BYU

(MWC) to (Independent)

BYU

Boise State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas A&M

(Big 12) to (SEC)

Missouri

(Big 12) to (SEC)

West Virginia

(Big East) to (Big 12)

West Virginia

TCU

(MWC) to (Big 12)

TCU

Temple

(MAC) to (Big East)

Temple

Fresno State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Fresno State

Hawaii

(WAC) to (MWC)

Hawaii

Nevada

(WAC) to (MWC)

Nevada

Syracuse

(Big East) to (ACC)

Syracuse

Pitt

(Big East) to (ACC)

Pitt

UCF

(C-USA) to (American)

UCF*

Houston

(C-USA) to (American)

Houston*

Memphis

(C-USA) to (American)

Memphis*

SMU

(C-USA) to (American)

SMU*

Middle Tennessee
(State)

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

FAU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)
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Colorado

FIU

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

North Texas

(Sun Belt) to (C-USA)

Texas-San Antonio

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Louisiana Tech

(WAC) to (C-USA)

Utah State

(WAC) to (MWC)

San Jose State

(WAC) to (MWC)

Texas State

(WAC) to (Sun Belt)

Idaho

(WAC) to (Independent)

Idaho

New Mexico State

(WAC) to (Independent)

New Mexico State
*First season of the
American Conference in
FBS.
** Last season of WAC in
FBS.

2014

7

Maryland

(ACC to Big Ten)

Maryland

Rutgers

(American to Big Ten)

Rutgers

Louisville

(American to ACC)

Louisville

East Carolina

(American to C-USA)

Tulsa

(American to C-USA)

Tulane

(American to C-USA)

Western Kentucky

(Sun Belt to American)
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Western Kentucky

Appendix D
FBS Conferences from 1998 to 2014

Conference

Years Active

American Athletic Conference

2013-2014

Atlantic Coast Conference

1998-2014

Big East

1998- 2012

Big Ten

1998- 2014

Big 12

1998- 2014

Big West

1998-2000

Conference USA

1998-2014

Independent

1998-2014

Mid-American Conference

1998-2014

Mountain West Conference

1999-2014

Pac-12

1998-2014

Southeastern Conference

1998-2014

Sun Belt

2001-2014

Western Athletic Conference

1998-2012
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Appendix E
Histogram of SAT for All Years
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Appendix F
Histogram of Admissions for All Years
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Appendix G
Histogram of Applications for All Years

111

Appendix H
Histogram of Enrollment for All Years
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